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TOWARD THE "TECHNO-CORPORATE" STATE? -
AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM*
ARTHUR SELWYN MILLERt
Preface
The purpose of this Article is to raise questions, not to
essay answers. It is to be considered an adumbration; much
of what is said is stated dogmatically. Reasons of space
necessitated this course; the reader should not think that the
writer sees the matters discussed as simple situations. Au
contraire, they are of the highest degree of complexity. As
is suggested toward the end of the Article, scientific and
technological problems are far more simple than are the con-
stitutional (the political-legal-economic) problems facing
modern America.
The Article is based on the premise that science and
technology are here and here to stay, as large and perhaps
increasing elements in American society. The genie is indeed
out of the bottle - and will not be returned, simply because
it cannot. There is no turning back from the path that man
has taken. The important question is how should science and
technology be used, not whether they should be. The further
assumption is made that science and technology have had,
are having, and will continue to have a significant impact on
the nature of American politico-legal (i.e., constitutional)
institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A BOUT MIDWAY in Professor H. L. Nieburg's recent In the Name
of Science, described on its dust-jacket as a "chilling account of
[the] growth of the scientific-military-industrial complex in America,"
this statement appears: "Instead of fighting 'creeping socialism,' [Amer-
ican] private industry on an enormous scale has become the agent of
a fundamentally new economic system which at once resembles tra-
ditional private enterprise and the corporate state of fascism."' This
Nieburg calls "the contract state" - a politico-economic system in
which the legal instrument of contract is used to weld some of the
nation's largest corporations to the federal government. One need not
subscribe to the hyberbole of book publishers to believe that Nieburg
has, however incompletely, called attention to an important emergent
problem in American constitutionalism. My thesis herein is that this
problem - in shorthand terms, the creation of the "techno-corporate"
state - will perforce have to be in the forefront of scrutiny by con-
stitutional scholars in the future.
These scholars may be lawyers 2 (although few have to date recog-
nized that a problem exists) or political scientists' or economists or
sociologists 4 (more exponents of these disciplines are working on as-
pects of the problem, although none has yet produced a systematic
analysis). A unilinear approach will not be sufficient to the need; what
is necessary is an inquiry that will mesh the insights of each of those
disciplines, put them into a common crucible, and produce a synthesis
that will at once be empirically valid and productive of a new con-
ceptual framework. Required is a new way of thinking about the
corporation and about government - and their interlocking relation-
ships. That is necessary not only for purposes of accurate description
of the American political economy (and thus of understanding), but
also because these two dominant institutions of the era, existing at a
time of cataclysmic change, present critical problems of the manage-
ment of social change. This Article, then, is a preliminary attempt to
outline some of the questions that must be answered before an adequate
analysis of one of the more pressing issues of modern constitutionalism
can be made.
1. H. N19BURG, IN THt NAMP oV ScIFNcP 190 (1966).
2. Adolf A. Berle is the leader. See, e.g., A. BERLE, ECONOMIC POWER AND THE
FREE SocIETY (1957); A. BtRIL, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959).
3. See, e.g., Swisher & Nelson, In Convention Assembled, 13 VILL. L. RZv.
711 (1968).
4. E.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); E. LATHAM,
POLITICAL THORIES A oUT MONOPOLY POWER (1957).
[VOL. 14: p. 1
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The question of the relationship of corporate business to govern-
ment is ancient; as Felix Frankfurter said just before he became a
Supreme Court Justice, "The history of American constitutional law
in no small measure is the history of the impact of the modern corpora-
tion upon the American scene."' That history (substantially less than
two centuries) has produced two convergent movements - toward
large economic organization and toward big government - which
today make the problem more urgent than it ever has been in the past.
Also suggested in this Article is the absence of data required to answer
many of the critical questions of the government-business symbiosis
(particularly in international economic affairs) ; and that, accordingly,
a problem of scholarship is to develop such factual material.
By "techno-corporate" state is meant:
(a) That the scientific-technological revolution, of which the
industrial revolution was merely an early stage, has produced a mar-
riage of entrepreneurship to organization and thus made possible the
rise of huge corporate "private" collectivities. These are called "super-
corporations" by Robert Heilbroner in his recent The Limits of Ameri-
can Capitalism;6 he suggests that about 150 corporations fit the label.7
Others, however, think in terms of about 500.8 However labelled and
however defined, they dominate the economy and set its tone; in so
doing they have created a new society, something far different from
that existing in 1787 or as recently as 1900 or even 1920. (Whether
gigantism in business was a necessary result of the growth of science
and technology is another question.)
(b) That the nature of government has changed from the
"negative, nightwatchman state" to the "positive state" - that is, to a
government with affirmative obligations to enhance the well-being of
the American people. Epitomized in the Employment Act of 1946,9
which established the Council of Economic Advisers and which by the
1960's had resulted in programs that led the London Economist to
herald an "unrecognized economic revolution"'" - toward the active
management of the economy - this is perhaps the most significant con-
stitutional change in American history. That it came without amend-
ment, but by legislative and executive programs either approved or
ignored by the Supreme Court, makes it all the more remarkable. It
5. F. FRANKFURT4R, THS COMM4RC CLAUSZ UNDSR MARSHALL, TANSY AND
WAITS 63 (1937).
6. R. HtILBRONSR, THz LIMITS op AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1966).
7. Id. at 11.
8. E.g., A. BgRLS, supra note 2.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1964). For an instructive analysis of the statute and
its significance see E. RosTow, PLANNING FOR FR'gDoM (1959).
10. EcoNOMIST (London), Aug. 8, 1964, at 550.
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is a classic illustration of how the Constitution can grow - Woodrow
Wilson likened it to a "living organism," saying that constitutions
must follow the laws of life and not of mechanics and that they must
be Darwinian and not Newtonian" - without change in the language
of the original document of 1787. (The extent to which governmental
duties or obligations may be becoming a constitutional doctrine, rather
than a political program, will be discussed below.)
(c) That the net result of the coming of big business and big
government is an interlocking partnership between the two. They
exist in a symbiotic relationship; little by little, they seem to be growing
closer together every year. This takes place by slow accretion, rather
than by fiat, through the myriad formal and informal transactions
between the two characteristic institutions of the day. (It is not at all
clear which is the dominant or senior partner.) The relationship cuts
across the entire field of corporate enterprise; thus it far transcends
the situation described by Professor Nieburg. The development has
so warped constitutional theory that the underpinnings of the 1787
document and its amendments have been seriously eroded. The nature
and theory of American constitutionalism, accordingly, require re-
examination and restatement in the light of the social realities of the
day and the probabilities of the future. ("Future-orientation" is an
increasing necessity.) The 55 men who wrote the Constitution foresaw
neither the rise of the supercorporation nor the Positive State. Cor-
porations were few and small and of little consequence in the late 18th
century. The Constitution did not provide for them (or for any other
decentralized social group.) In addition, the fundamental law made
no provision for the affirmative responsibilities of government.
The techno-corporate state is being built without amendment. But
that does not mean that the Constitution is not being changed; it is,
but by a different method. The "living" or "practical" Constitution, in
other words, may and does differ from the formal document. That
document, although written, must change by means other than amend-
ment, else it would long ago have been discarded. The eminent his-
torian, Frederick Jackson Turner, once said: "Behind institutions,
behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that
call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing condi-
tions." 2 One conclusion of this Article is that those "vital forces"
can alter the Constitution by a number of methods other than amend-
ment: by judicial exegesis of the basic text, by political practice (as
11. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN T1E UNITED STATES 56-57(1908).
12. F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (1920).
[VOL. 14: p. 1
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in the rise of political parties), and by deep-rooted alterations in the
structure of government, exemplified by certain fundamental statutes
and executive actions. What this means is that the techno-corporate
state can be and is being brought into existence without the need for
formal amendment.
II. THE RISE OF THE SUPERCORPORATIONS
As long ago as 1905, it was asserted that "the growth of corpora-
tions in western Europe and the United States signifies nothing less
than a social revolution."'" By the mid-1960's that "social revolution"
had become so solidified that corporations seem part of the "natural"
order of things, so much so that no serious intellectual opposition to
them is evident. They have become accepted and the question (which
is seldom raised) is how to deal with them rather than the more basic
question of whether they should exist at all. 4 It was not always so.
Historically, not only "big business" (the "trusts") was feared and
even hated, but the very idea of incorporation was long fought. Some-
thing that is taken for granted today - that the corporation is a
"person" and thus entitled to the protections of the Constitution -
did not achieve judicial acquiescence until 1886." Prior to that, of
course, the Supreme Court through astute and imaginative use of the
commerce and obligation-of-contracts clauses did create a protective
legal umbrella under which corporate enterprise could (and did)
flourish. The Dartmouth College case16 and Gibbons v. Ogden'7 are
leading examples of how the judiciary operated.' The trend that
began in the early 19th century, when corporations were small, had
by the mid-20th century produced the corporate giant, the super-
corporation, something new under the economic and legal sun.
The development is noteworthy for other reasons, two of which
are worthy of brief mention: the factor of change and the way in
which the supercorporations developed (as ad hoc responses to situa-
tions rather than in accordance with a prescribed theory or ideology).
13. 2 J. DAvIs, CORPORATIONs 261 (1905).
14. Compare R. HXILBRONZR, supra note 6, with Walton, Critics of Business:
Stonethrowers and Gravediggers, 1 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Fall, 1966, at 25.
15. Then it was accepted unanimously and without argument by counsel. See
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). Justices Black and
Douglas of the present Supreme Court have maintained that the Santa Clara case
should be overruled on that point. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.
552, 577 (1949) (dissenting opinion) ; Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson,
303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938) (dissenting opinion). But the idea has not been accepted.
16. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
18. Compare F. FRANKEURTER, supra note 5, with A. MILLER, ThE SUPREME
COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM ch. 2 (1968), for the history of the development.
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Change is a social constant. In less than two centuries, the
nation has been vastly altered, particularly in the creation of a unified,
if not uniform, society. In this process, the entrepreneur has combined
with the scientist and technologist to make stability a myth. Sociologist
W. Lloyd Warner put the point in apt words: "The whole American
society is rapidly growing into one primary community, in which
corporations along with other complex hierarchical structures play
their significant and necessary roles. Change is built into the very
nature of this social system ... ,,"' The concept of change, although
a truism, has not been fully assimilated by exponents of any one dis-
cipline. Law, for example, proceeds by denying change. ° The very
notion of law runs counter to that of continuing change, for law is
the social instrument of conservation. Economics, too, has not accepted
the concept; economists still think in terms of equilibrium (i.e., a
steady state) when the very nature of human affairs negates it.21
Furthermore, economists still tend to think of the corporation as a
"disembodied economic man" and to equate General Motors with John
Doe when talking about economic policy; as Andreas G. Papandreou
put it, "[T]he economist . . . [retains] his schema of an acting in-
dividual agent, even in the case of the firm, which may legitimately
be regarded as a 'collective' of some sort. . . . [T]he economist has
not evolved a theory of conscious cooperation. ' 22 Change, furthermore,
is now increasingly being seen as something to be managed; men seek
to control or to "invent" the future.2 Scientists, with the hubris
that tends to infect that fraternity, now believe that through choice
among scientific and technological developments the future can be
guided and even controlled. As Daniel Bell has said, "Perhaps the
most important social change of our time is the emergence of a process
of direct and deliberate contrivance of change itself. Men now seek
to anticipate change, measure the course of its direction and its im-
pact, control it, and even shape it for predetermined ends."'24 The
possible success of such efforts is not our point (although success or
failure is far from irrelevant); rather, it is in continuing change and
the acceptance of the challenge to manage change. This will have some
19. W.L. WARNxR, TH CORPORATION IN THE EMERGENT AMERICAN SOCIETY XV
(1962).
20. P. DIESING, ASON IN SOCIETY 154 (1962). See Miller & Scheflin, The
Power of the Supreme Court In the Age of the Positive State: A Preliminary
Excursus (pts. 1-2), 1967 DUKE L.J. 273, 522.
21. See D. ScHoN, TtCHNOLOGY AND CHANGE (1967).
22. Papandreou, Some Basic Problems in the Theory of the Firm, in 2 A SURVEY
0- CONTEMPORY ECONOMICS 183 (B. Haley ed. 1952).
23. See D. GABOR, INVENTING THE FUTURE (1963); Symposium, Forecasting
the Future, Sci. J., Oct., 1967 at 1.
24. Bell, Notes on the Post-Industrial Society I, PUB. INTURST, Winter, 1967,
at 25.
[VOL. 14: p. 1
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importance in the discussion below; to anticipate a bit, if the techno-
corporate state poses critical problems to the nature of American con-
stitutionalism, then how can social invention take place to make sure
that the fundamental values of constitutionalism are retained? One
further aspect of the concept of change is worthy of mention: what
Donald A. Schon has called "the problem of the development of an
ethic of change." His views merit quotation at some length:
The concept of an ethic of change very nearly appears as a
contradiction in terms. Our norms are precisely norms for sta-
bility. We hold on to our norms and objectives, stand fast by
them, keep them, and because we do, maintain a steady course
which enables us to dispense with an ethic of change. Our moral
heroes . . . are generally those who stand firm in the face of
challenge .... We are apt to see change of objectives and norms,
when it occurs, as inconstancy.
And yet the problem of the development of an ethic of change
now confronts individuals, organizations (companies and others)
and our society as a whole. The individual asks, How shall I act
when the foundations of my self (and the roots of my action)
are disappearing? The company asks, How can we find our way
into the future and maintain our integrity when it is no longer
clear what business we are in .. . ? Our society asks, How are
we to guide our course now that the instrument of technology has
eroded our objectives and we are deprived of the illusion of a
stable state toward which we are heading?25
Resistance to change, it may be noted, comes as much or more from
the intellectuals as from any other class. Those with a vested interest
in learning or in the mysteries of a given profession are likely to be
the very ones who most want to hold on to that interest.26 Ready
examples are those economists who still think in terms of atomistic
individuals acting in the economy and the practicing bar which stoutly
resists any proposed change in procedure.
The second preliminary point about the rise of the supercorpora-
tions - that they grew in response to felt circumstances and oppor-
tunities - has been aptly stated by William Letwin: "[E]conomic
doctrines have never as much influenced the making of American
economic policy as have political and constitutional considerations. The
reason why the whole of American economic policy looks so inco-
herent - with mercantilist, socialist, liberal, or autarkic elements all
25. D. SCHON, supra note 21, at 204.
26. As Arthur Koestler has cogently observed: "The inertia of the human mind
and its resistance to innovation are most clearly demonstrated not, as one might expect,
by the ignorant mass - which is easily swayed once its imagination is caught - but
by professions with a vested interest in tradition and in the monopoly of learning."
A. KOESTLER, THE SLIEPWALKERS 427 (1959). See also D. ScHoN, supra note 21;
M. SHANKS, THx INNOVATORS (1967).
FALL 1968]
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living happily side by side is that political balance rather than economic
consistency has been the more powerful drive."'2 7 Even so, it is fair
to say that legal doctrines, constitutional and otherwise, helped to
create a favorable milieu in which corporations could wax large and
strong. In addition, laissez faire was never a doctrine that prevented
government aid to business enterprise; throughout American history,
public resources have been employed to that end. 8 (It was only when
government undertook to help other groups in society [e.g., labor
unions] that the Supreme Court found that due process of law pro-
tected liberty of contract and thus made such attempts invalid.) What
this means has relevance to the general theme of this Article: the
power of the state was used to encourage corporate enterprise. Further-
more, while enterprises may have grown in an ad hoc, nonideological
manner, nevertheless they were justified after the fact on ideological
grounds. The businessman has never lacked for apologists among the
intellectuals. Oddly enough, the patron saint of those apologetics is
Adam Smith, who himself decried the tendency toward incorporation.
Said he: "The pretence that corporations are necessary for the better
government of the trade, is without any foundation."2 Businessmen
(and others) are still intellectual prisoners, as John Maynard Keynes
said, of some defunct academicians; avowed pragmatists, they tend
to believe the ideas of long-dead economists. And they aver that they
see in history something that never existed in fact: a sharp cleavage
between public and private, between government and business.30 When
President Coolidge opined that the business of this nation is business,
he was merely uttering a resounding truism. The point stressed is that
the pragmatic stream runs deep and strong in the development of the
economy. Corporations grew, not in response to government command
or even societal demand, but because conditions (economic and legal)
permitted growth. One of the conclusions of this Article, however, is
that the supercorporation is now a necessary institution; if it did not
exist today, it would have to be invented. In other words, the obliga-
tions of government require the supercorporations for their reason-
able fulfillment.
Be that as it may, the emergence of the supercorporation requires
no documentation here. It has become truistic that a few hundred of
27. W. LTwiN, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY Oi AMERICAN EcoNoMIc POLICY
SINCE 1789 xxix-xxx (1961). See P. JoNES, THx CONSUMER SOCIETY: A HISTORY
or AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1965).
28. Recounted in P. JONES, supra note 27.
29. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH op NATIONS 129 (Modern Library ed. 1937). See
also Mason, The Apologetics of "Managerialism," 31 J. Bus. 1 (1958).
30. J. KiYNES, THE GnN-RAL THEORY or EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
383-84 (1936).
[VOL. 14: p. 1
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the more than four million corporations in the, nation in fact control
the economy. As Heilbroner puts it in The Limits of American
Capitalism, one supercorporation by itself (A.T.&T.) has assets equal
to that of one million small businesses, if one takes $25,000 as the
average amount of assets of a small enterprise."' Fortune's annual
listing of the 500 largest American corporations is readily available,
and there are other studies of a like nature. Economist Victor Fuchs
has recently shown that the United States is the first "service"
economy - it is "the first nation in the history of the world in which
half of the employed population is not involved in the production of
food, clothing, houses, automobiles, and other tangible goods." 2 Even
so, this does not minimize the importance of the huge corporate com-
bines. Nor does the fact, if it is a fact (as Daniel Bell avers), that
the United States is becoming a "post-industrial society" and that the
"new men" of power are the "scientists, the mathematicians, the
economists, and the engineers of the new computer technology"3 -
for the supercorporations will remain; what Bell is talking about (in
part, at least) is who will control them, not whether they will exist.
(Further, one should be careful not to fall into the conceit of academics
and see power flowing to the man of ideas rather than the business-
man). 8' One other factor, which again does not reduce the importance
of the supercorporations, should be noted: the growing significance
of the "nonprofit" aspect of economic affairs; Eli Ginzberg has labelled
this development "the pluralistic economy." ' 8 Whatever the facts may
be, what has happened, is happening, and seems sure to continue, is
the growth of the pluralistic group as a center of economic power
within the nation. The inevitable concomitant of that development is
that those economic groups (however identified) have a political role
to play. The implication is clear: A new form of social order has been
created. That in turn has profound constitutional consequences.
Whatever the nature of the American economy may be today -
and whatever it may be in the future - requires at the outset close
and continuing attention to the facts of economic life; or, in other
words, to the prime necessity for gathering empirical data. Secondly,
the situation, once identified, presents the question of the reasons for
31. R. HeILBRONVR, supra note 6, at 9. It is also worthy of note that such cor-
porations as A.T.&T. and General Motors control more wealth than all except nine
of the nations of the world.
32. Fuchs, Some Implications of the Growing Importance of the Service In-
dustries, in NATIONAL BUREAU oP ECONOMIC R5StARCH, THt TASK op ECONOMICS
5-7 (1965).
33. Bell, supra note 24, at 27.
34. See id. at 24; J. GALBRAITH, supra note 4.
35. E. GINZBARG, THs PLURALISTIC ECONOMY (1965).
FALL 1968]
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the development. The first matter will be briefly discussed; the second
will be given more lengthy treatment, for it poses clearly the relation-
ship between science and technology and economic form.
One of the prime needs is for factual data dealing with govern-
ment, with business, and with their relationships. The requirement
is difficult enough when it comes to domestic affairs, but is even more
so when one attempts to learn about international commercial matters.
It is a characteristic of both government and business that secrecy tends
to be the norm; both institutions try to keep their internal operations
closed to inquiry. Perhaps business is more secrecy-conscious than
government, but both exhibit similar tendencies. When it comes to
external concerns, then facts about business endeavor are almost totally
lacking - not completely, but sufficiently so to make generalizations
risky. The same may be said for government. One of the most serious
difficulties encountered in conducting research into governmental activi-
ties is an inability to obtain the facts of given situations. (The newly
enacted section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act"6 is not likely
to remedy the difficulty.) 87 Moreover, it must be kept in mind that,
as Justice Frankfurter often said, one can never get correct answers
without first posing the correct questions. But "correct" questions
cannot be identified nor can facts be ascertained without a theory, or,
if you will, without an ideology. The old saw to the contrary not-
withstanding, facts do not speak for themselves. As Whitehead said,
they do not exist "in nonentity." General ideas are necessary. Morris
Raphael Cohen put it in these terms: "[W]ithout the use of concepts
and general principles we can have no science, or intelligible systematic
account, of the law or of any other field. And the demand for system
in the law is urgent not only on theoretical but also on practical
grounds. Without general ideas, human experience is dumb as well as
blind."'88 The point, in short, is two-fold: (a) there exists a great
need for empirical data about the subject under discussion; and (b)
obtaining such data will be most difficult. In addition, compiling facts
unavoidably involves the personal valuations of the person doing the
work. This presents the requirement, if objectivity is to be maximized
and if the reader of the studies made is to know the point of view
of the researcher, that the researcher (the compiler of facts) "face his
valuations." In other words, as Gunnar Myrdal has said, the problem
of valuation cannot be eliminated but it can be minimized by those
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III, 1968).
37. See Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L.
R.v. 761 (1967). See also Dobkin, The Release of Government-Owned Technical
Data Under the Freedom of Information Law: Between Scylla and Charybdis,
14 VILL. L. Riv. 74 (1968).
38. M. CoHEN, REASON AND LAw 63 (1950).
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engaging in scholarly research stating their value preferences. 89 There
is no greater delusion than that of "scientific objectivity" or "neu-
trality." That many act as if they were objective does not gainsay
that assertion.4 0 As P.B. Medawar has said, "unprejudiced observa-
tion is mythical. . . . In all sensation we pick and choose, interpret,
seek and impose order, and devise and test hypotheses about what we
witness. Sense data are taken, not merely given: we learn to per-
ceive . . . The idea of 'naive' or 'innocent' observation ... [should
be rejected]. 'Facts cannot be observed as Facts except in virtue of the
Conceptions which the observer himself unconsciously supplies.' "4.2
(The point is labored, for it seems fair to say that there is much belief
to the contrary; for example, exponents of "program budgeting" in
government apparently proceed on the assumption that personal value
judgments can be eschewed.) 48
A. Business Gigantism and Technology
If one asks, as he should, why there has been such a phenomenal
growth of corporate enterprise during the past century, he is forced to
search for the social bases of economic activity. Some lawyers, with
invincible parochialism, might attribute that growth, through a sim-
plistic cause-and-effect relationship, to favorable Supreme Court de-
cisions, but that surely does not get to the roots of the question. The
question is at least two-fold: first, why the growth of incorporation? and
second, why the growth to massive size of a few of those corporations?
How are these questions to be answered? One may begin by
posing the further question of whether history can supply answers. As
Edward Hallett Carr has said, "How can one discover in history a
coherent sequence of cause and effect, how can we find any meaning
in history, when our sequence is liable to be broken or deflected at
any moment by some other, and from our point of view irrelevant,
sequence?"" Furthermore, historical interpretation, it seems clear, is
bound up with value judgments, "The search for causalities in history,"
in the words of Meinecke, "is impossible without reference to values...
behind the search for causalities there always lies, directly or indirectly,
39. G. MYRDAL, VALUS IN SOCIAL THEORY (1958); Cf. M. POLANYI, PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE (1958).
40. See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. Ca'. L. Rev. 661 (1960).
41. P. MZDAWAR, Taz ART OF TH4 SOLUBLE 133 (1967).
42. Id. at 149.
43. See Hearings on S. Res. 54 Before the Subcomm. on National Security &
International Operations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 1, at 20-26 (1967) (statement of the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget) ; PROGRAM BUDGETING (D. Novick ed. 1965); cf. Held, PPBS Comes to
Washington, PUB. INTEREST, Summer, 1966, at 102.
44. E.H. CARR, WHAT Is HISTORY? 130 (1962).
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the search for values."45 One sees meaning or causation in history
where one wants to see it.
The point is fundamental. If it be assumed that science and tech-
nology are the root causes of the growth of corporate enterprise, this
leaves at least two important questions dangling: first, why did science
and technology erupt where they did and when they did? and second,
was gigantism a necessary result? As to the first, why did science
and technology burst forth among the peoples of the North Atlantic
littoral, at a particular time in history, and not elsewhere? We are
far from having adequate answers to such questions. It seems clear
that many of the basic ideas underlying science were known to the
peoples of the ancient world - in Greece and Egypt and probably in
China. Why were they not employed? Culture-bound anthropologists
might assign a superior virtue or intelligence to the peoples of the
North Atlantic states, but those are notions sure to be challenged in
other parts of the globe, and are in fact disputed by more broadly
gauged Western analysts (Claude Lvi-Strauss, for one)." Whatever
answer one gives to this basic question, the facts of corporate activity,
what Kenneth Boulding called "the organizational revolution,"4 seem
clear beyond peradventure - whether or not one accepts the gloomy
predictions of Roderick Seidenberg.4
However one answers the question of why science and technology
are confined in time and in space (in time, to the last two or three
centuries, and in space, to the nations of the North Atlantic littoral), the
further question obtrudes: What is the relationship between science
and technology and giant business enterprise? John Kenneth Galbraith,
in The New Industrial State, appears to select technology as the key
to a rational explanation of gigantism (and of economic planning).
Says he: "The imperatives of technology and organization, not the im-
ages of ideology, are what determine the shape of economic society. .... 49
Technology means the systematic application of scientific or other
organized knowledge to practical tasks. Its most important conse-
quence, at least for purposes of economics, is in forcing the division
and subdivision of any such task into its component parts. Thus, and
only thus, can organized knowledge be brought to bear on perform-
ance. . . . Nearly all of the consequences of technology, and much
of the shape of modern industry, derive from this need to divide and
subdivide tasks and from the further need to bring knowledge to bear
45. Quoted in id. at 101.
46. See C. UvI-STRAUSS, TRISTES TROPIQUEIS (1963).
47. K. BOULDING, TnE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION (1953).
48. R. SEIDENBARG, POST-HISTORIC MAN (1950).
49. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 7 (1967).
50. Id. at 12.
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on these fractions and from the final need to combine the finished
elements of the task into the finished product as a whole."'" To
Galbraith, six consequences result; they are: (1) "An increasing span
of time separates the beginning from the completion of any task"; (2)
"There is an increase in the capital that is committed to production
aside from that occasioned by increased output"; (3) "With increas-
ing technology the commitment of time and money tends to be made
ever more inflexibly to the performance of a particular task"; (4)
"Technology requires specialized manpower"; (5) "The inevitable
counterpart of specialization is organization"; and (6) "From the
time and capital that must be committed, the inflexibility of this com-
mitment, the needs of large organization and the problems of market
performance under conditions of advanced technology, comes the neces-
sity for planning." 2 (We shall come back to this idea of "the necessity
for planning" below.)
One can agree with much, even most, of what Professor Galbraith
says, and yet maintain that he has not demonstrated any necessary
causal connection between technology and gigantism in business. At
the very least, he suggests a situation of single causation; to him, tech-
nology is the key to "the new industrial state." But if anything is
known about social phenomena, it is that causation is multiple, not
unilinear. Complexity is our lot; it is too simplistic to pin the rise
of the supercorporations solely on "the imperatives of technology."5'
It is, in other words, one thing to say that technology permits the
growth of organization and the supercorporations; it is quite another
to say that it makes them necessary. Just as many lawyers attribute
a high degree of power to the Supreme Court and thus assume with-
out proof that the Court has made a difference in the nature of
American capitalism,54 so Galbraith seizes on one factor and excludes
consideration of others. To make only the least controversial state-
ment: the supercorporations could hardly have grown to their present
size without a favorable legal system and without the untapped re-
sources of a virgin continent upon which to draw.
Whatever may be the reasons for the rise of the supercorpora-
tions, one thing now seems clear: For reasons that will be set forth
below, they now seem to be necessary for the fulfillment of societal
goals. In short, if they did not exist, many of the goals of modern
51. Id. at 13.
52. Id. at 13-16.
53. Professor Harry Magdoff, reviewing Galbraith's book, questioned "Galbraith's
selection of technology as the key to a rational explanation of gigantism and
planning . . . ." Magdoff, Book Review, 205 NATION 246, 247 (1967).
54. The power of the Court is questioned in Miller & Scheflin, upra note 20,
and in A. MILLZR, supra note 18.
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government could not be met. Possibly, those goals will not be met
in any event; the point here is that without collective enterprise - the
supercorporations - they would be idle dreams. No more evidence
need be cited to buttress that statement than to point to the USSR;
there, the process of industrialization resulted in the creation of huge
hierarchically structured, bureaucratically managed organizations. The
main economic difference between the USSR and the USA, in this
sense, "lies less in the character of the rules of the game than in who
sets them. In socialism, the rules are set by political government. In
capitalism, they emerge indirectly from a body of law and custom,
founded on the concepts of private property and slowly developed." 55
B. A Model of the Corporation
What is a corporation? is a question not easily or quickly an-
swered, save on a superficial level. Of course, there is no such thing
as "the" corporation, for on the order of 4.5 million enterprises are
incorporated in the United States; there is no model which would
adequately and briefly describe the variety of types of firms (to say
nothing of other forms of corporate activity, such as "nonprofit" enter-
prises). But some sort of rough model may be constructed for the
supercorporation. The problem merits at least brief attention.
Although the corporation is a "person" within the terms of con-
stitutional law, and thus entitled to the protections of the Constitution,
it is obviously far more than that in fact. It is a collectivity, an organi-
zation with drives and purposes of its own transcending those of any
segment of the constellation of interests that make it up. Two decades
ago, economist-lawyer Walton Hamilton in characteristically colorful
language said: "The legal make-believe that the corporation is a
person, the ingenuities by which it has been fitted out with a domicile,
the elaborate web of 'as-ifs' which the courts have woven, - have
put corporate affairs pretty largely out of reach of the regulations we
decree."56 The corporation, he said, unlike real persons has "no ana-
tomical parts to be kicked or consigned to calaboose; no conscience
to keep it awake all night; no soul for whose salvation the parson may
struggle; no body to be roasted in hell or purged for celestial enjoy-
ment." No one can lay "bodily hands upon General Motors or, West-
inghouse . . . [or] incarcerate the Pennsylvania Railroad or Standard
Oil (N.J.) complete with all its works."57 In the traditional and still
orthodox view, the corporation is an entity with only one kind of
55. R. MARRIS, Tiin EcoNoMIc THMORY Or 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM 2 (1964).
56. W. HAMILTON, ON THE COMPOSITION OP THE CORPORATE VEIL, quoted tn
B. EELLS & C. WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS 132-33 (1961).
57. Id. at 133.
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interest: the property of its stockholders. But it is not that simple,
quite possibly because the concept of property itself is not simple; the
supercorporation is an entity sui generis that requires a sociological,
as well as legal and economic and political, definition." In his presi-
dential address to the American Economic Association, Professor Fritz
Machlup said in 1966 that he was "sure there are at least 21 concepts
of the firm employed in literature of business and economics . . . 9
He then proceeded to list 10 of these,"° no one of which coincides with
the model suggested here. Machlup's difficulty is that he views the
firm through the eyes of the economist; he thus exhibits the same short-
comings as Galbraith and others who approach the supercorporation
from one direction only.
In many respects, the corporation cannot be defined briefly and
comprehensively. It is more nearly a method than a thing; or as
observed in a leading treatise on corporation finance: "The legal at-
tributes of the corporation are mere accidents of historical development;
they do not describe the corporation as we understand it, nor do they
give us any clue to its social and economic significance in our modern
industrial society. The human institution of marriage may be described
as a legal contract, for under the convenient caption of a contract the
jurist would group marriage, the corporation, and the house-to-house
delivery of milk. An agreement of two persons to live together gives
no more understanding of marriage as a vital present-day institution
than the filing of certain papers with the Secretary of State gives an
understanding of the corporation as a present-day institution .... The
corporation is an institution and its reality lies not in legalistic defini-
tions but in the part the corporation plays in the complex balance of
forces that constitutes the economic world of the present time. What
we are interested in, if we try to define a corporation, is its function,
as an institution - and a very important and significant institution -
in our contemporary economic life. This is not a question of law, but
of the meaning of the thing as it now exists in the economic life of
the twentieth century."'" As yet, no one, in whatever discipline, has
evolved a viable theory of conscious cooperation - although some
efforts have been made.62 What is suggested here is that the super-
58. See Mason, Introduction to THr CORPORATION IN MODERN SocieTy at 1
(E. Mason ed. 1959).
59. Machlup, Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial, 57 AM.
EcoN. Rgv., Mar., 1967, at 26.
60. Id. at 27-28. The ninth in his listing is this: "In legal theory and practice,
the firm is a juridical person with property, claims, and obligations. This may be a
very deficient formulation; I defer to the experts, who will surely correct it."
61. 1 A. DEWING, THg FINANCIAL POLICY Ol CORPORATIONS 16-17 (5th ed. 1953).
62. See, e.g., R. EALLS & C. WALTON, CONCCP'UAL FOUNDATIONS or BusINEss(1961).
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corporation is best viewed as a sociological community, consisting of
a number of disparate and cooperating (albeit at times antagonistic
cooperation) elements; it is, in a nonanthropomorphic sense, an or-
ganism built around a principle of organization for production and
distribution. The constellation or federation of interests constituting
the corporation may be subdivided into those internal to the firm and
those external. The internal segments include:
(1) The stockholders - Those who own but do not control.
They supply the capital represented by the capital stock, the corporate
bonds, and other corporate financial obligations. (Perhaps they should
be labelled the "security holders.") In traditional legalistics, the cor-
poration exists to serve the property interests of the stock or security
holders. That property interest is not in "the" corporation; rather, it
is in a piece of transferrable paper, a promise to pay dividends when
those who in fact control the corporation deem it desirable to do so."
(2) The managers - Those who control but who do not neces-
sarily own (if they do own, it is only a small part of the total). In-
cluded are members of the board of directors and of the managerial
hierarchy. Galbraith uses the label, "techno-structure," in discussing
this segment, defining it as embracing "all who bring specialized knowl-
edge, talent or experience to group decision-making. 64  The point
here has been well made by Michael Young: "Every industrial society
is governed by a series of managerial bureaucracies, and it is surely
right to speak of them as conforming to a common type. Managerial
organizations are strikingly similar, in industry along with govern-
ment, in education and research along with the armed services. Almost
all institutions in almost all advanced societies are run by graded
hierarchies of managers, officials, or officers who do not 'own' but
control; the posts filled by appointment nominally on grounds of merit
instead of by election or inheritance; the officials salaried, permanent,
and pensionable; the whole structure governed by written rules and
regulations." 6 Young, it will be noted, suggests not only the oligar-
chical tendencies of modern enterprise but also agrees that industrial
societies tend to form similar economic institutions (what Galbraith
63. See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY(1932); J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDR (1958); Manning, Book
Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477 (1958).
The thesis of the divorce of ownership and control has been vigorously dis-
puted. See Beed, The Separation of Ownership from Control, 1 J. ECON. STUDIES,
Summer, 1966, at 29; 1967 THE TIMEs (London) LITERARY Supp. 1097. The criticism
is that the Berle-Means hypothesis has not been substantiated by the facts. However,
that criticism may apply to the 4.5 million corporations, but not to the few hundred
supercorporations.
64. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 71.
65. Young, Preface to J. BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION at 11 (1962).
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calls "the principle of convergence"). (The nature and extent of
such similarity is, in many respects, the subject matter of this Article.)
(3) The rank-and-file employees - Often these are members of
the union. They are to be distinguished from the managerial class and
the white collar worker who is not a member of the union. Note that
this (and the next) listing suggests a coincidence of interest between
corporation and union; the model suggested includes the union as a
part of "the" corporation.
(4) Union managers (or leaders) - To an immeasurable yet
marked extent, the officers of the union may be set aside as a separate
segment of the corporate community. In their relations to the rank-
and-file workers, they may be analogized to corporate management and
its relationship to security holders.
Seen in this way, "the" corporation does not exist as a monolithic
entity; the "it" becomes the "they"; just as property has been defined
as a bundle of interests, 66 so too the corporation may be seen, in Abram
Chayes' phrase, as a "federation of association groupings. '"" In other
words, federalism may be fruitfully employed as an organizing principle
in constructing a model of the supercorporation. The same principle,
it is appropriate to note, may also be applied to the relations among
large companies - vis-A-vis each other - and to their posture to the
state.6" Seen in this way, the supercorporation thus can be considered
to be a sociological community - the community of the factory, which,
as Peter F. Drucker once put it, is the most meaningful unit of local
government in the United States.6" However, the internal groups of
"the" corporation do not constitute its entirety; they are matched in
some respect by the external segments, including:
(1) Suppliers - Those enterprises, many of them corporations
themselves, that provide logistic support to the supercorporation in the
making of its final products. They also may supply services to the firm.
(2) Dealers - Those who retail the products of the supercorpora-
tions. As with the suppliers, the dealers are linked to "the" corpora-
tion by contractual agreements.
(3) Consumers - This group is more amorphous and nebulous;
it is made up of the individual members of the public (and other cor-
porations) who are the buyers in the market.
66. See RESTATEMENT Olt PROPERTY § 5 (1936); cf. Reich, The New Property,
73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
67. Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION
IN MODERN SOCIETY 45 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
68. See Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE CORPORA-
TION IN MODERN SOCIETY 72 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
69. P. DRUCKER, THE Nzw SocIETY (1950).
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(4) The public generally - This is the most nebulous of all. It
involves what might be called the public interest or the interest of
society in the activities of the corporate community. Articulated
through government, it is not necessarily the arithmetical sum of all
of the disparate interests in the nation; it may at times be a trans-
cendent interest. 70
Admittedly, the model is rough. Others, such as Chester I. Ber-
nard, distinguished between two kinds of corporate responsibilities
aside from legal obligations: "(1) those which may be called internal,
relating to the equitable interests of stockholders, creditors, directors,
officers, and employees; and (2) those relating to the interests of com-
petitors, communities, government, and society in general."17  On the
other hand, Eells and Walton maintain that: "The varieties of claim-
ants on the corporation - and hence upon the resources controlled by
managerial decision makers - can best be understood in another way:
through a study of the art of governance within the corporate con-
stellation and through a consideration of the roles of direct and indirect
claimants and contributors to the wealth and welfare of the organiza-
tion. 72 They then identify as direct claimants the security holders,
employees, customers, and suppliers; and as indirect claimants, com-
petitors, local communities, and the general public and governments.
Of particular interest here is the assertion that a study of "the art of
governance" is desirable in order to understand "the" corporation. The
point is crucial and is worth extended treatment; before discussing it,
however, one further aspect of the rise of the supercorporation needs
mention.
C. The Corporation and the State
Writing two decades ago, Peter F. Drucker maintained in his
classic The Concept of the Corporation (a study of General Motors) :
"It might even be said without much exaggeration that the corporation
is really socially and politically a priori whereas the shareholder's posi-
tion is derivative and exists only in contemplation of law"7 - which
suggests that the corporation is an anthropomorphic "Group-person"
in the Gierkian sense.74 Surely the corporation is a government, a
70. See pp. 51-53 infra.
71. Barnard, Elementary Conditions of Business Morals, 1 CALIF. MANAGEMENT
Rzv., Fall, 1958, at 7.
72. R. EZLLS & C. WALTON, supra note 62, at 149.
73. P. DRUCKZR, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 21 (1946).
74. See 0. GIXRKn, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OP SOCIETY, 1500 TO 1800(paper ed. 1957). See also Latham, Anthropomorphic Corporations, Elites, and
monopoly Power, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 303 (1957).
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"private" government to be sure, but nevertheless "government through
and through," as Arthur Bentley put it several decades ago.75 The
sociological corporate community may meaningfully be seen as a
political system as well as an economic entity; as Professor Earl
Latham has said, "A mature political conception of the corporation
must view it as a rationalized system for the accumulation, control,
and administration of power."'70 It - the supercorporation - may also
be usefully viewed as a unit of federalism, of functional federalism,
nongeographical but in many respects of more significance than the
50 purportedly sovereign States of the union. The 50 States make up
the system of formal federalism; their importance may lie more as a
source of Senators than as a repository of real power.
With respect to the national government, the "corporate states"
are of far greater importance than are the 50 geographical entities. The
latter are significant mainly as administrative districts for centrally
established policies; they are, in large part, anachronisms in the body
politic. Writing in 1908, Woodrow Wilson asserted that "the question
of the relation of the states to the federal government is the cardinal
question of our constitutional system."77 That may have been accurate
when Wilson wrote, but if so, it no longer is. The marriage of science
and technology to entrepreneurship has created the far more important
question of the relation of the supercorporations to the federal govern-
ment, even though Justice Frankfurter once observed, somewhat testily,
that the "unifying forces of modern technology '7 8 have not wiped out
State lines. The learned Justice was accurate so far as formal federalism
is concerned, but quite mistaken with respect to functional or economic
federalism. The supercorporations have produced a national economy
which is superimposed upon a decentralized formal political order, and
in so doing, have so warped the federal system that it bears little re-
semblance to that which existed in 1800. The point was made by
Professor Wolfgang Friedmann 10 years ago: Not many years ago,
"advocates of 'pluralism,' . . . pleaded for more recognition of the
social groups within the State . . . in mitigation of the legal and
ideological glorification of the State. A generation later, the question
must be raised in all seriousness whether the 'overmighty subjects' of
our time - the giant corporations, both of a commercial and non-
commercial character, the labor unions, the trade associations, farmers
organizations, veterans legions, and some other highly organized
75. A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 268 (1967).76. Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THs CORPORATION IN
MODERN SocIEY 220 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
77. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVSRNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 173(9.P(19.7 Polish Nat'l Alliance Y. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 650 (1944).
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groups - have taken over the substance of sovereignty. '79 Functional
federalism is a way of describing nongeographical private governments
which operate within the American polity. The power of the units of
functional federalism is far greater than that of the units of formal
federalism.
As Max Lerner has said, "A new constitutional structure of in-
dustry and government is emerging, with a new separation of powers
that is more relevant for contemporary America than the classical sepa-
ration of governmental powers." 80 If for "separation of powers" is read
"federalism," then that statement sets out the point sought to be made
here: the governmental character of the supercorporations (which will
be discussed in detail in the next section) and their close tie-in with
government. That government relationship is often spoken of as a
"partnership," and in fact it may be so thought even though it is far
from clear at this time which of the partners is dominant or senior.
(This is one of the unanswered questions of the techno-corporate state.)
The close alliance between government and business may be seen in the
activities of many government agencies; for example, the Pentagon,
NASA, and the Atomic Energy Commission could not operate without
the assistance of corporate enterprise. These are the agencies that have
definite tasks to perform - national security, "shooting the moon,"
developing nuclear energy, and the like. Those listed are merely illus-
trative of a much larger picture. Moreover, those agencies that were
set up to regulate segments of industry (and it is noteworthy that those
industries ostensibly regulated are almost wholly products of science
and technology) have close and continuing ties with the industries
regulated. Often, it would appear, the concept of regulation has merged
subtly into a concept of protection of the industry, thus bearing out the
famous advice of Richard Olney, President Cleveland's Attorney Gen-
eral, to a friend who was president of a railroad and asked for informal
advice as to what to do with the newly created Interstate Commerce
Commission. Said Olney: "My impression would be that looking at
the matter from a railroad point of view exclusively it would not be
a wise thing [to try to get the ICC abolished] .... The attempt would
not be likely to succeed; if it did not succeed, and were made on the
ground of the inefficiency and uselessness of the Commission, the result
would very probably be giving to it the power it now lacks. The Com-
mission, as its functions have been limited by the courts, is, or can be
made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for
a government supervision of railroads, at the same time that super-
79. Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law,
57 COLUM. L. Riv. 155, 165 (1957).
80. M. LERNiR, AMXRICA AS A CIVILIZATION 289 (1957).
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vision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commis-
sion gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business
and railroad view of things. It thus becomes a sort of barrier between
the railroad corporations and the people and a sort of protection against
hasty and crude legislation hostile to railroad interests.... The part of
wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it."'" The
pattern is far from uniform, but the lesson of history seems to be that
Olney's advice has been proved by the evolution of the so-called inde-
pendent regulatory commissions (which, it may be noted, are not inde-
pendent nor do they do much regulation). Quite possibly, as has been
suggested by Professor Louis L. Jaffe, this is what Congress had in
mind when the commissions were established. 2 Be that as it may, for
present purposes the point is that even in the instances of those agencies
that ostensibly regulate business, some sort of symbiotic relationship
has grown up. It is not unfair, accordingly, to maintain that in the area
of regulated industries the corporations act with the protection of the
state, to perform functions that the state deems desirable. Or as Justice
Louis D. Brandeis put it, "Whether the corporate privilege shall be
granted or withheld is always a matter of state policy. If granted, the
privilege is conferred in order to achieve an end which the State
deems desirable. '8 3
A consequence is that the line between what is supposedly public
and what is private is blurred, even erased entirely in some respects.
Economist Robin Marris, writing from England, puts the matter some-
what differently in making what is the same basic point: "[T]he
industrial capital of western democracies is no longer divided into two
classes, 'public' and 'private', but rather into three, 'public', 'private',
and 'corporate'. The corporate sector likes to be described as 'private',
but this may represent no more than a desire to conceal . . . .", A con-
tinuum may be constructed showing how the supercorporations relate
to government, running at the one end from those that are in fact "arms
of government" (the weapons system producers, for example) to those
at the other end which have only a minimum formal legal ties to govern-
ment (A.T.&T. is a good example here). The point is that wherever
a given supercorporation falls upon the continuum, there is a high,
albeit varying, degree of dependence upon the state. Some are entirely
dependent upon government largesse for their existence; these include
the industries which operate only because they have a government
license (for example, the radio and television networks, the airlines, the
81. Quoted in L. JAFFZ, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 12 (1965).
82. Jaffe, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 1068 (1956).
83. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933) (dissenting opinion).
84. R. MARRIS, THg ECONOMIC THEORY OV 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM 13 (1964).
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natural gas pipelines). Others rely only upon a favorable legal system
and an ability to influence, if not entirely control, the flow of political
decisions emanating from the Congress and the public administration.
All interact with the state, not only in dependence for their very exist-
ence, but also because they have now become necessary to the state.
Furthermore, as Harry Magdoff recently put it, "There is more than
a mild interest by the corporate organizations in U.S. foreign policy
and its military complement as a convenience in sustaining a com-
fortable business environment." '85
Enough has perhaps been said to indicate that the antagonism
between business and government is more alleged than real - both
historically and contemporaneously. As President Coolidge said, the
business of America is business - and the business of American
government throughout history has been business. Possibly, the inter-
locking relationship may be somewhat more obvious today than in the
past, for the requirements of the state have been greatly enhanced in re-
cent decades (just as the needs of the supercorporations have changed),
but the generalization remains valid that the state has always been as
strong as it had to be (and as it was compelled to be by economic
interests).86 The mythology, of course, is different; under the set of
beliefs once dominant (and still quite evident), the state was the enemy
of business, something to be fought and held off. However, the type of
thinking that led to the movement in law called "legal realism," by
which scholars looked to what existed (and exists) in fact rather than
accepting situations on faith, has cut through much of the myth in
recent years. Not that we are entirely free from it; the contrary is
more likely the situation, for we labor under conceptual constraints
that have little coincidence with reality. There is a well-nigh infinite
capacity of the human mind to deny reality, to hang on to old ideas
long after they have been exploded. Just as men usually see in history
what they want to see, they tend to believe what they want to believe.IWhat is needed is an organizing principle around which may
be constructed a meaningful analysis and description of the govern-
ment-business symbiosis. At highest level abstraction, that principle
is here stated in terms of the "techno-corporate" state. Of a somewhat
lesser level of abstraction, the term "economic planning" seems par-
ticularly useful in this context. Here, again, however carefully one
uses the term, he runs the risk of misunderstanding - if for no other
reason than that many businessmen (and their academic votaries)
strongly condemn the concept, mainly, it would seem, because it is
1861 (1965), with P. JONES, supra note 27.
85. Magdoff, supra note 53, at 247.
86. Compare S. BRucHEY, THE RooTS ol' AMERICAN EcoNoMIc GROWTH 1607-
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connected with "socialism" and other devils of current mythology. As
Professor Firmin Oul~s has said, "Few other expressions can be so
loosely employed; those who use the word, whether as a term of appro-
bation or abuse, seldom realize exactly what planning as a whole means
or understand the differences between the various types of planning. ' s7
Even so, it may be used as an organizing principle. In so doing, how-
ever, it should be made clear that the term is used here in a somewhat
different context and manner from what it normally is. In the exposi-
tion, it is necessary to look to what happens in fact, as distinguished
from what purportedly takes place. As Oul~s says, "What matters in
planning is not the official statements made on the subject nor the
organizations officially set up for the purpose; the vital questions are
the economic structure of the country, coordination of the various
components of an economic policy and of the development of invest-
ment in the various branches of the economy. It is the contents of the
bottle which matter, not its label.""8
In looking to the contents of the bottle of economic planning, it
is best to think, not in terms of a static condition that has remained
steady throughout American history, but in terms of a trend or tend-
ency. Change having been at least endemic since 1787, if we are to
understand where we are, it is desirable to know where we have been;
and if we are to try to control where we want to be in the future, then
trend-thinking becomes unavoidable."0 Since we will revert to the
question of planning again below, for present purposes all that is
necessary is to set forth, perhaps too dogmatically, an adumbration of
economic planning in the American experience.
We may begin with a basic postulate (or assumption) : Economic
planning, in a certain minimal sense, has always existed in the United
States. The state has never been neutral to economics; its main posture
in the past was that of making decisions to help business (which by
the 1850's had become corporate) enterprise. The legal system, both
legislative and judicial, operated to that end, whether it was in the form
of subsidies (tariffs, land grants to railroads, etc.) or in the form of
private-law decisions which in effect favored business (such as the tort
doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk) or in the
form of constitutional law decisions which invalidated attempted official
limitations on business activity."0 Immigration policies providing a
steady flow of cheap labor, an inflow of capital to the developing nation
from Europe, enormous natural resources, and the absence of foreign
wars were other contributory factors to the growth of the economy.
87. F. OULkS, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DzMocRAcy 27 (1966).
88. Id. at 47.
89. See H. LASSWXLL, THn WORLD RXVOLUTION OF OUR TiME (1951).
90. See A. Mmum, supra note 18.
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The trend in history, however, is from a minimal type of planning to-
ward active state intervention and participation in economic affairs.
Throughout, the basic planning unit of the United States has been the
business enterprise - now the supercorporation. What is to be seen
(and what will be discussed below) is that the degree of affirmative
government intervention in what are sometimes called "the prerogatives
of management" has increased steadily, and has taken an exponential
leap since 1930. The theme of this Article is that this trend is leading,
slowly but ineluctably, to the formation of the techno-corporate state.
The United States has now moved at least to a position called by
Gardiner Means "facilitative planning" ;1 and it seems likely that the
trend will continue. (This does not mean, nor should it be taken to
mean, that planning is well done; nor that the creation by slow accre-
tion of the techno-corporate state is a situation to be welcomed un-
critically. Quite the contrary.) The question, now as always, is not
whether planning exists, but who does it, for what ends, to whose gain?
Professor Galbraith finds in "the imperatives of technology" a
need for planning arising from "the long period of time that elapses
during the production process, the high investment that is involved
and the inflexible commitment of that investment to the particular
task." 2 Planning is essential because business management "aims to
minimise [sic] uncertainty, to minimise [sic] the consequences of un-
certainty, or both," 3 and looks to the state to absorb some of the
major risks. It is, says Galbraith, the compulsion of technology, rather
than ideology or "political wile," that requires corporate management
to seek the help and protection of the state. 4
Singling out technology as the key to an explanation of planning
seems, to repeat what was said above, much too simplistic. If planning
is viewed under the trend suggested here, then quite obviously tech-
nology is only one of the factors leading toward the greater participation
of officialdom in business affairs. Other influences would surely include
the closing of the American frontier, the rise of equalitarianism (long
ago forecast by de Tocqueville), 5 the emergence of the United States
as the single most powerful nation in the world (connected, of course,
to science and technology), and the need for a system of rationing scarce
resources (as radio and television frequencies, airline franchises, and
the like - which, again, are connected with technology). Galbraith's
model is inadequate. He apparently thinks of technology as an "irre-
91. G. M9ANS, THE CORPORATE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 186 (1962).
92. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 19.
93. R. MARRIS, supra note 84, at 232.
94. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 4, passim.
95. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Vintage ed. 1945).
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pressible force of nature, to which we must meekly submit.""6 That may
be accurate, but it will take more than his bald assertion to make it so.
One further aspect of modern economic planning may be men-
tioned: As the system has grown, and as it works now, it tends to
favor segments of American society, without accompanying benefit to
(although not necessarily at the expense of) other segments. Put
another way, the American system of planning may be said to have
produced the American form of the "welfare state," and that at least
three different groups tend to benefit from that system. There are, in
other words, three versions of the welfare state - the "rich man's,"
the "poor man's," and the "intellectual's." Of the three, the most con-
troversial is the least expensive - the "poor man's" version. This is
the program which funnels funds to dependent children, unemployed,
"poverty" projects, and all of the other examples of governmental in-
tervention to aid the disadvantaged. It is one of the ironies of the age
that it occasions the most heated debate and is usually the first to be
thought of when someone suggests reducing the federal budget. There
is still a moral stigma attached to being poor ;97 those who want some
measure of economic and psychic security are scorned and derided by
the very ones who have it. (This is exemplified by a former President
of the United States, a man who has spent his entire life since adoles-
cence on the government payroll and who, even today, takes advantage
of the free medical services of the Government even though he is a
millionaire; and also by a former candidate for the Presidency who
had the good fortune to inherit a department store from his parents.
Economically secure, they sneer at those who yearn for that security.)
Much more expensive is the "rich man's" version, which in many
respects should be combined with the "intellectual's" version, for these
two groups often act in tandem. These versions are also much more
respectable. The rich man's welfare state may be seen in many diverse
programs; for example, the tax laws tend to favor (despite the myth
to the contrary) those with wealth, the oil depletion allowance being
only one of the more prominent ;98 subsidies are routinely paid to cor-
porations in industries considered to further the "national interest"
(shipping, airlines, etc.) and also to farmers (who more and more tend
to be "corporate," rather than individual) ; the automobile industry is
subsidized by massive highway programs (built, it should be noted,
with little regard to aesthetics or the humanistic values) ; and corporate
combines are kept in existence through contracts for the production
of items the value of which is dubious or at least subject to question
96. 110 CONG. REc. 10,480 (1964) (Law Day Address of Vice Admiral Rickover).
97. See Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-
Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YAIU L.J. 286 (1962).
98. See P. STERN, THrE GREAT TREASURY RAID (1964).
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(the supersonic transport is the obvious example here) .9 In many
respects, much of the rich man's welfare state exemplifies the "military-
scientific-industrial complex" against which President Eisenhower
warned in his farewell message.
Complementing the rich man's version is that of the intellectual,
particularly the scientist and technologist who can with little difficulty
obtain government contracts or grants for a bewildering variety of
purposes. With the federal government spending on the order of $15
to $20 billion annually, with our commitment to technology being in
Professor Harold Green's phrase "irresistible, irrevocable, and irre-
versible,"'0 0 this segment of welfarism seems likely to continue and even
to expand. The net result is that, just as some of the largest supercor-
porations owe their very livelihood to government contracts, so too do
some of the most prestigious universities in the nation. The "federal
grant" university has become a familiar part of higher education.'
Furthermore, literally thousands, even millions, of people - scientists
and technologists as well as "blue collar" and other workers - are
dependent upon federal funds. Not, be it noted, as members of the civil
service, but as employees for corporations, for universities, for "non-
profit" corporations. Further, these groups (and these individuals)
have an interest in the continuance of such government programs, and
raise thereby serious problems of governance.
Writing several years ago, Professor Carl Kaysen called the
"proposition that a group of giant business corporations, few in num-
ber but awesome in aggregate size, embodies a significant and trouble-
some concentration of power" a clich. Ile went on to say that a few
large corporations exert significant power over others; "indeed . . .
over the whole of society with respect to many choices, and over large
segments of it with respect to others." Power he viewed as "the scope
of significant choice" open to "any actor on the social stage."'0 2 The
question is indeed one of power, power in a political sense. That the
supercorporations exercise significant political power requires separate
treatment.
III. PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS
We have argued above that the American people live in a new
economic order, in which the most important segments are the super-
corporations. Each of those enterprises, although a person in law, is
99. Cf. H. NIEBURG, supra note 1.
100. Green, The New Technological Era: A View from the Law, BULL. Ol THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Nov., 1967, at 12.
101. See C. KERR, THE Uses o, THE UNIVERSITY (1963).
102. Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Powert What Scope?, in THE COR-
PORATION IN MODERN SociETY 85 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
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in fact a collectivity, a federation of interests, a private government, a
political order. The outlines of the "corporate states of America" are
set forth in this section.
The key question, as has been said, is one of power; to the defini-
tion of Professor Kaysen may be added that of Professors Lasswell
and Kaplan: "Power is participation in the making of decisions: G has
power over H with respect to the values K if G participates in the
making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H."'0 3 It will readily
be seen from such definitions that the concept is not easily reduced to
a formula; however, for the following discussion power will be con-
sidered to be the ability or capacity to make decisions affecting the
values of Americans. How, then, does the supercorporation exercise
power? If it does in any significant way, can it then be called an instru-
ment of American governance? The several ways in which power is
exercised may be summarized under the following headings.
(1) The supercorporations make decisions of national or societal
importance. They set national policy in significant areas of concern -
allocation of recourses, the direction and nature of investment, and so
on. Alone or in concert with others, they set prices (either collusively,
as in the electric conspiracy cases, or in the system of "administered"
prices, which may be thought of as a form of taxation), carve up
markets (often in concert with government, as in the airlines), and
even go so far as to subsidize the arts and education.0 4
(2) Much of officially announced public policy is in fact an
amalgam of private bureaucracies interacting with public officialdom."0 5
The supercorporations often can "veto" proposed public policies and
also, in some instances such as the supersonic transport, can actually
establish policy. Professor Galbraith maintains that public policy often
is a resultant of the interactions of the technostructures within the
supercorporations and their counterparts in government. 0 6 So it seems
to be. Policy thus becomes the product of a parallelogram of conflicting
group forces, with government often the broker among those groups
but also having an interest of its own to further.' As has already
been stated, some of the public agencies established for the ostensible
purpose of regulating industry, or other facets of American life, act in
fact as surrogates of the very activities purportedly controlled. Com-
103. H. LASSWLL & A. KAPLAN, POWVR AND SocmTry 75 (1950).
104. See R. ELLS, THE CORPORATION AND THs ARTS (1967); BusiNESS AND
Soci4TY (C. Walton & R. Eells eds. 1967).
105. See G. MCCONN4LL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966).
106. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 4, ch. XXXIV.
107. This is a model of the "group basis" of policy making. For brief discussion
and references see Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN.
L. REv. 620 (1958).
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pare, in this regard, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board;
compare also the Veterans Administration with the Department of
Agriculture; NASA with the Pentagon; and so on.' It is here, in
the setting of "requirements," i.e., that which the government will buy
or subsidize, that the military-industrial-scientific complex may be seen.
But the situation is much broader than even the huge scope of military
and scientific affairs.10 9
(3) The supercorporation is often an agency of administration for
government. Government, faced with mounting responsibilities the
root cause of which is often science and technology but which is not
permitted to expand the formal civil service, farms out staggering
amounts of the public administration, of governing power, to private
organizations. "Contracting-out" is particularly evident in research
and development. There is scarcely an American governmental organ,
including Congress, that does not participate in the system, a system
that is creating an "external bureaucracy" in ostensibly private organi-
zations."' Those organizations may be profitmaking, as corporations,
or "nonprofit," such as universities. It should be remembered, in this
context, that as Bishop Hoadly said many years ago, the true lawmaker
is he who has the power to interpret the laws (to administer) rather
than the person who first prescribes the norm."'
(4) The supercorporation is a private government because in its
internal operations it is a political order. The task of those who control
the enterprise is to make a profit, but not necessarily to maximize
profits; rather, profits are "satisficed," for the oligarchs who control
the firm (thereby exemplifying Michels' "iron law of oligarchy")2
must perforce balance the interests of the corporate community and
take into consideration the "public interest." Quite often, the enter-
prise operates private judiciaries; for example, in the system of indus-
trial jurisprudence that has developed during recent decades and in the
"Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act" of 1956."'
108. There is, it might be said, "vertical integration" in American government,
between the governed and the governors. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BusINEss
l3Y INDMEENDENT COMMISSION (1955) for an account of the phenomenon in the very
area where government agencies were set up to regulate.
109. It could scarcely be otherwise, unless public policy became solely a matter
of fiat or dictate.
110. See Miller, Administration by Contract: A New Concern for the Adminis-
trative Lawyer, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 957 (1961).
111. See J.C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES Or LAW 102 (2d ed. 1927).
112. R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (C. Paul & E. Paul transl. 1962).
113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964). See Latham, supra note 76, at 234; Redford,
Business as Government, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRACY 63 (R. Martin
ed. 1965).
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(5) The supercorporation, alone or in concert with others, oper-
ates to legislate in the field of contract law. Contract law, as it de-
veloped, was the analogue, if not the product, of free-enterprise
capitalism, a system based on individual enterprise or, at most, small
shops. It is the legal concept appropriate to an economic system in
which reliance is placed on exchange rather than tradition or custom
or command for the distribution of resources. In an individualistic
society, all law is ultimately based on contract, that is, derived from
choices freely made by responsible individuals. But the demise of
laissez faire and the rise of corporate combines have created a "new
feudalism" in which contracts are not so much the result of bargains
struck as of adherence to already established terms. Government con-
tracts provide the classic illustration, but in the private sector most
transactions still called contract are really "contracts of adhesion." The
relationship tends to be one of power, not of bargain, in which the
group dominates to set the terms and conditions under which agree-
ments are made. Administered prices furnish the ready example; the
contract of adhesion is the analogue of administered prices and price
leadership. Freedom of contract has degenerated into the "freedom"
to choose which agreement one will "adhere to." Standard-form con-
tracts, in other words, are legislative prescriptions of the corporate
communities and trade associations.
1 14
(6) Finally, the supercorporation is a private government in those
firms that control the mass media of communication. Again, they act
in concert with government, particularly when a license is required (as
in radio and television), but also, as Jacques Ellul maintains, because
the media are employed by government in a pervasive system of propa-
ganda that is so characteristic of the modern age." 5 This, it may be
noted in passing, helps to make nonsense of the Supreme Court's
asseverations about the "marketplace theory of truth."," In this time,
as in the past, "the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution
is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another
till they pass into commonplace but which all experience refutes."' "
When John Stuart Mill said that in 1874, the mass media had not yet
come into existence. Today, with government secrecy policies, managed
114. See F. KESSLER & M.P. SHARP, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-13
(1953). It is worthy of mention that the law of contracts, as purveyed in the case-
books used in law schools, by and large tends to reflect an age long gone - the
pre-supercorporation, if not the pre-industrial, age. See W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY (1959).
115. J. ELLUL, PROPAGANDA (1965).
116. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See Barron, Access to
the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. Rzv. 1641 (1967).
117. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 97 (1947).
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news, immensely complex public policies remote from a person's im-
mediate experience, lack of candor by government officials, and other
examples of pollution of the stream of information, the problem is
enormously more difficult, the marketplace of truth a much more
obvious fiction."
In many respects, the corporation with substantial involvement
in world trade - the transnational or multinational corporation -
provides better illustration of the firm as an instrument of governance
(even though, as noted above, it is difficult and often impossible to
garner precise factual data about those enterprises). The point may
be made by first emphasizing the governmental (i.e., political) nature
of the corporation domestically and then discussing the multinational
firm. Corporations are governments for a number of reasons, to sum-
marize what has been said in this section; they develop and allocate
resources, attract the loyalties of millions of individuals, and generally
perform functions indispensable to the members of American society.
Although not so considered in orthodox constitutional theory, they
perform and have performed vital public functions. This was recognized
by a seminal thinker, Henry Carter Adams, who wrote in 1902 that
every great industrial enterprise is clothed with a quasi-public interest.
Not only are the public as consumers interested in administration of
the economy, but, of more importance, a business organization is a
depository of social power, and for this reason cannot be properly
administered independently of social considerations. Said Adams:
"Corporations originally were regarded as agencies of the state. They
were created for the purpose of enabling the public to realize some
social or national end without involving the necessity of direct govern-
mental administration. They were in reality arms of the state, and in
order to secure efficient management, a local or private interest was
created as a privilege or property of the corporation. A corporation,
therefore, may be defined in the light of history as a body created by
law for the purpose of attaining public ends through an appeal to
118. In the complex web of our social and economic structure, which tends to
place the vital organs of expression and public opinion in the hands of a few
individuals or of the public authorities themselves, there is constant need to
ensure that the essence of democratic values is not eroded at its very source. Is
it really practicable to create a climate of geniunely free opinion and discussion
within a framework of control retained by a tiny minority of powerful individuals
and groups? As Lord Radcliffe has recently remarked, "Censors will be very
powerful but will not even be identified as censors," for what may be permitted
to emerge in these various organs of opinion may depend upon what the owners
and publishers of newspapers and the producers of broadcast programs consider
as suitable for the public eye or ear. Hence, in the future, the idea of law must
not confine itself to grappling with the technical problem of giving effect to
human values through legal machinery, but must take thought as to what means
may be devised for ensuring that the stream of free thought does not dry up at
its source, by virtue of monopoly control.
D. LLOYD, TH4 IDgA OF LAW 329 (1964).
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private interests.""' 9 Of course, since Adams wrote (and even before),
the myth was to the contrary: The corporation was a property interest
existing for the sole betterment of the shareholders.
That the corporation is a government existing cheek by jowl
with public government in a pluralistic system, and exercising economic
sovereignty, has been asserted by a number of qualified observers in
recent years, including Earl Latham, Richard Eells, Adolh A. Berle,
Alexander M. Pekelis, Wolfgang Friedmann, Robert E. Hale, Peter
F. Drucker, John K. Jessup, Justices of the United States Supreme
Court, and judges on other federal and State courts. Government by
private groups is an operational reality in the United States. How-
ever, it may be one thing to label the supercorporation a government
so far as domestic affairs are concerned and quite another to conclude
that a corporation is a private government internationally. General
Motors or the Ford Motor Company or any other supercorporation, as
centers of economic power, wield such an influence and exercise such
a control over many segments of domestic life that it is not difficult
to consider them to be governmental in nature.120 Turning, however,
to external affairs, can it be said that the large corporation operating
mostly or substantially externally (e.g., the Arabian-American Oil
Company) is also a private government? The answer can only be
affirmative. In fact, it may be easier to equate, in politico-legal theory,
the international "private" corporation with government than it is for
the domestic firm. Sigmund Timberg has described the situation well,
in an article discussing the corporation as a technique of international
administration; says he:
England, Holland, and the other great trading powers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were delegating political
power to their foreign merchants, when they permitted those mer-
chants to engage - collectively and under the corporate aegis -
in foreign trade. In Maitland's classic phrase, these were "the
companies that became colonies, the companies that make war."
The same proposition holds for the modern large corporation.
The modern state undeniably delegates political power to large
private corporations, as it does to the large labor unions with
which the corporate behemoths deal. The authorization of collec-
tive activity has, at least since the time the early Christian and
Jewish communities had their difficulties with the Roman Em-
perors, always been a state prerogative. Furthermore, the activi-
ties authorized for a large corporation involve such functions as
price-fixing, the division of markets, the setting of wages, and the
general development of local communities, functions which in a
119. H. ADAMS, RELATION OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION, AND EcoNoMics
AND JURISPRUDENCE 145 (J. Dorfman ed. 1954).
120. Redford, supra note 113, provides a good brief discussion.
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pre-Industrial Revolution era had been the primary responsibility
of the State. It has been said of international cartels that some
of the more powerful of them "are little empires in themselves,
and - their decisions are often more important than those of
'sovereign political' entities like Holland, Denmark or Portugal."
The same could be said even more forcefully of the political
strength of that more cohesive unit, the international combine; the
notion that international combines and cartels are strong political
entities is no longer a monopoly of the intuitively minded economist
or political scientist. Judges have described international cartels
as instruments of "private regulation," and have called an Ameri-
can subsidiary the "commercial legation" of its British parent.
Even the counsel involved in drafting international cartel agree-
ments speak of a trade area as so-called neutral territory, or to
put it another way as "spoils" belonging to the British and our-
selves as allies in the late war. Such a consistent use of political
terms is more than a mere metaphor; it is a recognition of an
underlying reality.121
The ultimate question, in formalistic terms, is one of sovereignty
which is ultimate power - and sovereignty, according to Bodin and
others, is indivisible. But does that accord with the facts? Is there,
in Lord Bryce's term, a "practical" sovereign as well as a "legal"
sovereign ?22 The corporation does not necessarily acquire sovereignty
merely by being permitted to exist; after all, during the growth and
heyday of nationalism corporations handled a nation's credit or its
transportation, as well as performing other important functions. But
"practical" sovereignty did flow to the corporations, particularly in
international affairs but also domestically, when the state, either through
indifference or preoccupation with other matters or by being subtly
"taken over" by the supercorporations, endowed them with new and
significant characteristics. "These new attributes were irrevocable im-
mortality, a very large area of immunity from supervision by the state,
and an indifference to (at times even a conflict with) the general
political objectives of the state."' 23 Another way of putting the matter
would be to say that public government has formal authority by which
it ostensibly rules economic affairs but that in fact corporations exer-
cise effective control over much of the details of those relationships.
Shared power over economic affairs does not mean, however, that the
power-wielders operate wholly independently of each other. Quite the
contrary. Often the political sovereignty - the formal authority -
121. Timberg, The Corporation as a Technique of International Administration,
19 U. CRi. L. Rev. 739, 742-43 (1952). See Miller, The Corporation as a Private
Government in the World Community, 46 VA. L. R-v. 1539 (1960).
122. Quoted in Miller, Transitional Transnational Law, 65 COLUM. L. Rvv. 836,
840 (1965).
123. Timberg, supra note 121, at 744.
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of public government is invoked to aid the economic sovereignty of
the corporations. As Wolfgang Friedmann has said, "Public and
private activities, and with them, public and private law, are today
increasingly intermingled." '124
The consequence is clear and unmistakable: A constitutional
change of major dimensions has taken place. The label for the product
of this profound alteration is the "techno-corporate" state.
However, at the same time that the corporations have waxed large
and strong, government has undergone an exponential change. During
this century it has proliferated far beyond the wildest thoughts of
the Founding Fathers. This, in briefest terms, is the rise of the Positive
State, a government with affirmative obligations to perform wholly
different from the functions of the "negative, nightwatchman state."
It is to this that we now turn.
IV. THE "POsITIVE STATE"
Writing several decades ago, Leon Duguit asserted that: "Any
system of public law can be vital only so far as it is based on a given
sanction to the following rules: First, the holders of power cannot
do certain things; second, there are certain things they must do.' 121
The "cannot do" of that formulation is a shorthand expression for
much, perhaps most, of historical American constitutional law. The
"must do" is just now coming into view, so far as constitutional doc-
trine is concerned, although it has become a familiar political feature
during the past three decades. In this section, the outlines of what by
any criterion is probably the most significant constitutional change in
American history - the coming of the Positive State - are set forth.
The Positive State has undermined the preconceptions of classical con-
stitutional theory in much the same way that the modern corporation,
as Gardiner C. Means has said, "has undermined the preconceptions of
classical economic theory as effectively as the quantum undermined
classical physics at the beginning of the twentieth century."' 26
In briefest terms, the Positive State is a shorthand label for the
express acceptance by the federal government - and thus by the
American people - of an affirmative responsibility for the economic
well-being of all. It involves a societal shouldering of a duty to take
action to create and maintain minimal conditions within the economy -
124. Friedmann & van Themaat, International Cartels and Combines, in 3 ANTI-
TRUST LAWS at 508 (W. Friedmann ed. 1956).
125. L. DUGUIT, LAW IN THIX MODERN STATE 26 (1919).
126. Means, Collective Capitalism and Economic Theory, in Tnr CORPORATION
TAKE-OVER 67 (A. Hacker ed. 1964).
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of economic growth, of employment opportunities, of the basic necessi-
ties of life. Exemplified in a broad range of programs, federal and
State, it is the American version of the welfare state. (That all do not
share equally in the largesse distributed, in one way or another, under
welfare programs has been discussed above.)
The Positive State received its charter in 1946 when Congress
enacted the Employment Act, 127 surely one of the most important legis-
lative actions ever taken in American constitutional history. In form
a statute and thus outwardly not of the dignity of a constitutional
precept, it nonetheless overshadows most, if not all, of the true con-
stitutional amendments. Written in constitutional language of high-
level abstraction with little particularity or precision in prescription,
the Act should be considered as making constitutional law, but by
Congress and not, as is the usual situation, by the Supreme Court. Its
enactment symbolized a series of other statutes that brought about a
radically different government-business symbiosis from that which
existed prior to the 1930's. Often mislabelled the Full Employment
Act, its purpose may be found in its preamble :..
The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable
means consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential
considerations of national policy, with the assistance and coopera-
tion of industry, agriculture, labor, and State and local govern-
ments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and
resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining, in a manner
calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and
the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded
useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for
those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum
employment, production, and purchasing power.
With that pronouncement, economic planning, which as has been
suggested has always been a feature of American government, now
became overt and expanded. Prior to 1946, of course, a series of
Supreme Court decisions had already given approval to facets of plan-
ning. Not that much of the 19th-century style of planning got to the
Court. Quite the contrary; most activities were not litigated, the
exceptions being attempts by State governments to deal with interstate
commerce 12 9 and both the federal and State governments in the post-
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1964).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (1964). For discussion see Miller, An Affirmative Thrust
to Due Process of Law?, 30 Gxo. WASr. L. Rev. 399 (1962).
129. See, e.g., Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and
an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. Riv. 1051 (1960); Developments in the Law, Federal
Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. lRv. 953 (1962).
.[VOL.. 14: p. I
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 1
https://digitalc mmons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/1
"TECH No-CORPORATE" STATE?
Civil War era to deal with some of the problems brought on by indus-
trialization."' (It is worth at least passing attention that the law of
the former, on State attempts to tax and regulate interstate commerce,
is still viable; but that the latter - that is, economic due process -
has been largely repudiated.' 31 ) One can go back to the mid-19th
century to find examples of federal economic-planning activities that
did get to the courts; perhaps the Legal Tender Cases.32 is as good an
illustration as any. Munn v. Illinois133 began the concept of "businesses
affected with a public interest," a concept that permitted State regula-
tion of a limited class of businesses. Munn lasted until the early 19 30's,
until the Supreme Court decision in Nebbia v. New York.. which in
effect said that any business which government chose to regulate was
affected with a public interest.3 5
This familiar history need not be recounted at this time. What is
emphasized is that, while some manner of planning has existed through-
out American history, there is a great difference in the type of planning
(and of government) that has come into being since the constitutional
watershed of 1937. The difference may be one of degree or it may be
one of type, depending on how one reads American history. It is the
change from the "negative state" to the Positive State. The Supreme
Court legitimized the Positive State in the series of decisions beginning
in 1937, but which may have had their real beginning in the early
cases of Nebbia v. New York, 136 Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell,13 7 and the Gold Clause Cases."" The turning point did come
in the 1930's, whatever landmark case one chooses. In the judgment
of the writer, the important corner was turned in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish,' decided prior to the famous Jones & Laughlin4 '
decision upholding the National Labor Relations Act.
130. Recounted in the rise and fall of "economic due process." See McCloskey,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court, in SUPREMZ COURT RjvIZw 34 (P.
Kurland ed. 1962).
131. The doctrine still retains some viability in State supreme courts construing
State constitutions. Since 1937, however, only one decision, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957), has invalidated business regulation under the Federal Constitution, and
that was on equal protection, not due process, grounds.
132. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 287 (1861).
133. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
134. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
135. The history is recounted in A. MILLER, supra note 18.
136. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
137. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
138. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) ; Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
139. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
140. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). A number of
commentators use this case as the turning point.
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Although still in the process of being worked out, enough is known
even now to enable one to trace the contours of the new posture of
government. They include the following:
(1) The change from a Constitution of limitations to one of
powers; or, as Edward S. Corwin termed it, "a Constitution of powers
in a secular state.' 14 1 So far as litigation is concerned, the emphasis
to 1937 was on limitation - with the Supreme Court acting, mainly
negatively, as "the first authoritative faculty of political economy in the
world's history . "..."142 The "constitutional revolution of the 1930's"
reversed that, insofar as economic policy is concerned. Perhaps the
Parrish opinion of Chief Justice Hughes provides the transitional key,
in which the due process clause, rather than being a limitation on
governmental power, "becomes an actual instigation to legislative action
of a levelling character."'4 The notion of limitation still remains, but
not in economic policy matters. Witness the language by Hughes:
The principle which must control our decision is not in doubt.
The constitutional provision invoked is the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment governing the States, as the due
process clause in the Adkins case governed Congress. In each
case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regu-
lation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is
this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that depriva-
tion the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncon-
trollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and
connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social
organization which requires the protection of law against the evils
which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.
Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the
restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the com-
munity is due process."'
That statement changed the nature of liberty under the Constitution
and ushered in the Positive State. Tacit recognition was given to the
view that liberty could be infringed by forces other than government
and, of even more importance, that those forces may require the affirma-
tive intervention of government to counteract them. Individuals, as well
as governments, could now be limited by due process. In economic
terms, the power of the state could counteract the power of private
141. E. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE (1950).
142. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 7 (1924).
143. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 161 (1948) (emphasis omitted).
144. 300 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added). See Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to
Due Process of Law?, 30 Gto. WASH. L. Rev. 399 (1962), for discussion.
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collectivities. In other words, due process does not mean only liberty
against government; it can also be used by government to restrain the
liberty of some in the "interests of the community."
When Parrish was followed shortly thereafter by the Jones &
Laughlin case and the Social Security Cases,4 5 upholding congressional
encouragement of labor union activity and (in the latter set of cases)
congressional employment of the taxing and spending powers to
further "the general welfare," the legal barriers to the Positive State
crumbled. 1"6 The gates were opened to other acts of Congress and
of the Executive, usually but not always in tandem, which brought
overt welfarism to American government. The point should be refined:
What happened is that government largesse, which had been confined
to the business community theretofore, was now extended to other
societal groups. It is to be emphasized that government welfarism in
the 19th century, which went mainly to business enterprise, of course
benefited others as well; subsidies to the railroads, for example, were
of benefit to the community at large, and even tariffs tended to help
other members of the corporate community than the entrepreneurs.
The point is simply that the federal government assumed responsi-
bility for the guidance of economic affairs in the interests of all; the
principle of equality, long present in the nation, received official cogniz-
ance. That principle was spelled out explicitly in the Employment
Act of 1946.117 In constitutional doctrine, this has meant the desuetude
of the concept of economic due process and the decline of the Supreme
Court as an authoritative faculty of political economy.
(2) "Democracy," Professor Frank H. Knight recently said, "has
assumed the task, enormously more difficult than enforcing a law
known to all, of deciding what the law ought to be and making any
changes called for."' 4 In present context, this means that with the
coming of a Constitution of powers, the American democracy has
assumed the task, immensely more difficult than merely umpiring the
private decisions and disputes in the market, of deciding what economic
policy ought to be and of taking action to effect necessary changes.
In other words, the second noteworthy feature of the Positive State
is the advent of an overt system of economic planning by the federal
government.
145. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
146. Presciently foreseen by E. CORWIN, THs TWILIGHT Olt THE SUPREM4 COURT
ch. IV (1934), although Professor Corwin failed to foresee the emphasis on civil
libertarian issues by the Court during the past 20 years.
147. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1964).
148. Knight, On the Meaning of Justice, NOMOS VI: JusTIce 2 (C. Friedrich
& J. Chapman eds. 1963).
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Although, as has been said above, it is not inaccurate to say that
some sort of economic planning has existed throughout American
history, today's version is basically different. The trend toward more
active and direct governmental participation in economic matters may
be viewed as a system in which decisional power over economics is
shared, in greater or lesser degree, by the officials (usually in the public
administration) and the corporate managers. The American system of
planning now is "facilitative"; it involves basic reliance on the private
character of economic and commercial enterprise but insists that cer-
tain decisions of the corporate community be taken "in the public
interest.' 49 As such, it falls far short of the almost completely planned
economies of Communist China and the Soviet Union.
All economic processes involve the making of decisions; those
decisions are made in two principal ways - by government authorities
who seek to manage the operations of the economy and by the market,
through the decisions of enterprises, unions, workers, farmers, in-
vestors, and consumers. Both features exist in all economies, although
different emphases are given. In the United States, the market is
relied on with government making those minimal decisions considered
desirable to influence the nature and character of that market - chiefly
in the direction of economic growth and employment opportunities.
Conversely, communist nations depend mainly on the plan, although
some scope is given to free choice by workers and farmers and other
individuals. Thus the federal government facilitates economic growth
and seeks to control inflation through the use of such techniques as
wage-price guidelines announced by the Council of Economic Advisers.
That Council, established by the Employment Act of 1946,15° is the
nerve center of the American planning operation. (This does not mean
that it operates in a vacuum. It has close and continuing contacts with
the business community, particularly the managers of the supercor-
porations and trade union officials.) That planning may be minimal,
but it nonetheless exists. All nations - developed and less developed,
private enterprise and state socialist - can be located, as Theodore
Geiger has said, "somewhere along a continuum which ranges from
comprehensive and detailed planning by the national authorities of all
significant aspects of economic activity to reliance upon decentralized
nongovernmental decision making in accordance with market conditions
as influenced by government policies."' 51
149. This is not to say that the concept of "the public interest" has been given
substantive content. Quite the contrary. See Miller, The Public Interest Undefined,
10 J. PuB. L. 184 (1961).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1023 (1964).
151. Geiger, Planning and the Market in Economic Decision Making, 13 LOOKING
AHEAD, Dec., 1965, at 5.
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The modern economy thus is the planned or managed economy.
In the United States, the responsibilities of the Employment Act are
implemented by three types of legal and economic arrangements, two
of which have relatively long histories. The first, however, is, at least
in its present-day scope and intensity, rather novel: the manipulation
of fiscal and monetary policy to carry out the broad purposes of the Act.
This is accomplished by the Government and the Federal Reserve
System attempting to control the amount of money spent for goods
and services in a volume sufficient to assure high levels of employment
without precipitating the pressures of general inflation. Included are
tax policies, adjustment of the discount rate, and governmental ex-
penditures ("pump-priming"), which together make up a system of
indirect controls of economic activities. By "indirect" is meant that
the government is not a participant in the decisions business managers
make; what it does is to take action that, in its cumulative impact,
alters the milieu in which the businessman operates (and which, for
a number of firms, is a direct source of funds for corporate viability).
Accordingly, it narrows or circumscribes the range of choices that
corporate managers may make. But this is not so much to control
but to stimulate the market, and thus to help produce economic growth
without the debilitating effects of inflation. It is to be noted that
governmental activity of this type both aids business (even when it
controls) and uses business to help accomplish given ends (maximum
employment, for one; national security, for another). The norm here
is cooperation, however outwardly antagonistic it may seem. The con-
flicts that occur, in the main, are over details of facilitative planning,
not whether it should take place.
The second and third instruments for carrying out the Employ-
ment Act are complementary: on the one hand, the competitive and
regulated markets for goods and services, and on the other, the labor
market in which corporate managers and union leaders are authorized
to legislate the rules governing the relationships of business enterprise
and its labor component. The market is a complex system of inter-
action between business units and consumers and government; it is, as
Eugene V. Rostow has observed, an economic order which is also a
system of law.'52 Similarly, the business-labor symbiosis has produced
a system of industrial jurisprudence, a sort of common law of the
corporate community. In these instruments, as with the first, one
essential point is to be noted: activity, whether public or private or, as
is so often the case, a combination of both, is aimed at producing what,
for want of a better term, may be called "the common good." The
152. E. RoSTOW, PLANNING FOR FRzEDOM (1959).
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techniques through which the Employment Act is implemented, in other
words, all aim at maximizing the general, as distinguished from the
particular, interest. True it is that the individual decisions of business-
men and union officers are usually taken in an effort to further their
particular or parochial interests without much reference to what the
over-all social impact might be. But this is accomplished, nay, per-
mitted, by government only because of the assumption (thus far, largely
warranted) that these parochial decisions will through the cautious
guiding hand of government inure to the common good. The "invisible
hand" of Adam Smith has been replaced by the visible, albeit indirect,
hand of the federal government, which intervenes just enough in the
private sector to create the conditions that fulfill the goals of the
Employment Act. (Not that those goals are fully realized; far from it.
There is here, as elsewhere, a considerable gap between aim and reality.)
When viewed in terms of effects, the American-style economic
planning institutionalizes the government-business partnership. Govern-
ment uses the business enterprise to achieve societal goals. That this
is accomplished often without any legal link (contract, incorporation,
etc.) should not be allowed to obscure the underlying and fundamental
reality. If, as has been said, science and technology permit the growth
of the corporate communities, then the programs of the Positive State
make them necessary. Without them, those programs could not be
accomplished - unless government chose to produce the manifold
goods and services "in house." "Managerial capitalism" in many re-
spects differs little from "managerial socialism"; the industrial enter-
prises of both systems are basically similar. Where they differ is how
"the rules of the game" are set. The difference, as Raymond Aron
has shown, is fundamental ;153 what they have in common is not neces-
sarily more important than the differences between them. The rules
of the game in managerial socialism come from the centrally imposed
plan; in managerial capitalism, they are a resultant of an intermixture
of public and private influences with a large measure of discretion or
autonomy left to corporate managers (within certain broad limits).
In return for a certain degree (rather high) of security, the enter-
prise pays the price of shared control over decisions. The supercor-
porations are not guaranteed immortality by government, but they may
act with the assurance that government will not take any action that
153. R. ARON, THc INDUSTRIAL SOCIETy ch. 3 (1967). See also R. HEILBRONER,
THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 90 (1966): "An economic transformation of
capitalism of such magnitude that its big businesses become, in effect, public agencies
is not a serious possibility for the foreseeable American future, barring a military or
other calamity that would wreck the existing order." But he goes on to say that
within 20 years there may be "a much more elaborate system of controls over the level
of its total output and its grand division among various social purposes than exists
at present." Id. at 94.
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will endanger their existence (for example, the antitrust laws are not
likely to be invoked against bigness) ; further, they have some degree
of assurance that government will step in and help maintain their via-
bility should they run into troublous times. This latter point deserves
special treatment. Mentioned above has been the notion of the "rich
man's" version of the welfare state, through the operation of which
a number of corporations are kept alive by government subsidy or
largesse - as clear an illustration of the corporatist nature of the
American political economy as can be shown. (American corporativism
is being built by slow accretion, rather than by fiat; it thus retains the
possibility of not being akin to the repressive forms of corporativism
known in other nations, such as Mussolini's Italy and Franco's Spain.)
But of perhaps even more importance than the fact of public aid
to private collectivities is the manner in which such decisions are made.
It is here that economic planning, American style, shows its greatest
shortcomings. The system has worked best in two strictly limited
areas - defense and space. The question here is whether those two
goals should be almost the sole preoccupation of the techno-corporate
state? "The challenge facing America," says Michael Shanks, "is not
a technical one, it is a challenge of social, political, and psychological
adjustment, to adapt the ideals of the eighteenth century to the facts
of the twentieth."'5 4 The race that really matters is that of exploiting
the discoveries of technology for the maximization of the nation's
wealth and happiness (and for the betterment of mankind). Of what
avail to "shoot the moon" if American society disintegrates (as it is
at this writing) ? Thus one perceives what may be called a con fusion
of priorities evident in the system of American planning. This prompts
the question: Why? Why build a supersonic transport which will carry
a few members of the jet set a few hours faster across an already tiny
planet, when the cost is not only noise pollution but a failure to deal
with some pressing human problems of a crowded planet (and nation) ?
The question of confusion of priorities can be little more than
posed. One answer that may be given, even though at best it is but a
partial clue, is in the manner in which public policy decisions are made
in the American government. This in turn poses the problem of con-
structing adequate descriptive models of the decisional process. This
will be discussed further below. Suffice it at this time to say that it is
here that President Eisenhower's warning about the power of the
"military-industrial-scientific" complex applies, if it does at all.
(3) Thirlin this listing of the contours of the Positive State
are the changes that have occurred and are continuing to occur in the
154. M. SHANKS, THE INNOVATORS 101 (1967).
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constitutional framework of government, principally within the basic
divisions of power (federalism and separation of powers). This topic
could itself be the subject of a separate article or book; what is said
now is the briefest of adumbrations. The essence of this proposition is
that power is being centralized in the United States; the development
may be seen in the desuetude of historical federalism, in the decline of
Congress, and in the consolidation of power within the executive
branch in the office of the Presidency.
First, as to federalism: When the decision in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co.,'55 upholding the National Labor Relations Act,
was followed soon thereafter by cases validating the Social Security
legislation,' 56 the constitutional underpinnings for a new form of
federalism were established. "Dual" federalism now became "coopera-
tive" federalism, and thus posed squarely the continuing viability of a
system of formal federalism. This led Harold Laski in 1939 to assert
that "The federal form . . . is unsuitable to the stage of economic and
social development that America has reached .... I infer . . . that the
epoch of federalism is over .... ""' That belief was echoed in 1955
by Karl Lowenstein: "Experience . . . demonstrates that, whatever
strength of tradition and emotional values of political theory federalism
is still imbued with, the economic imperatives of the technological state
require unified if not uniform economic policies throughout the entire
territory and do not brook that kind of economic fragmentation which
goes with effective member-state sovereignties."' s Like it or not, fight
against it as one will, the political, economic, and technological con-
ditions of the modern era do not permit now, and ever increasingly
will not permit in the future, that diversity that is federalism. The
formal structure of American government will probably remain, for
political organizations have a way of existing, like vermiform appen-
dixes, long after their functions have atrophied; but the substance and
the content will be elsewhere, plump as some will (for example Max
Ways) for something called "creative" federalism, 5 ' the important
decisions are being and will continue to be made in Washington and
other national institutions (such as the supercorporations). A nation
with a central income tax and with overt economic planning cannot
be truly federal; by the same token, a federal nation, the economy of
155. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
156. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
157. Laski, The Obsolescence of Federalism, 98 Ntw REPUBLIc 367 (1939).
158. Lowenstein, Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary
Age, in CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II 211
(rev. ed., A. Zurcher ed. 1955).
159. Ways, "Creative Federalism" and the Great Society, FORTUNE, Jan., 1966,
at 121.
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which is dominated by the supercorporations, cannot be federal. A
national economy superimposed upon a decentralized political order
has the inevitable result of changes (in fact though not in form) of the
political order. Furthermore, the "corporate states of America" - the
supercorporations - are vastly more important than the 50 allegedly
sovereign political States. 6 '
As with federalism, so it is with the separation of powers (a
misnomer, it should be noted, for what the Constitution established is
a system of separate institutions sharing the same powers - quite a
different thing). Here the trend, throughout American history and
accelerating in recent years, has been toward the aggrandizement of
power in the Executive. As recently as 1885, Woodrow Wilson could
maintain that "the predominant and controlling force, the center and
source of all motive and all regulative power, is Congress .... 161 The
Legislature is the aggressive spirit."' 2 Today the "aggressive spirit"
is clearly the Executive, both in proposing legislation and in its final
content. Congress, faced with the mounting tasks of government and
institutionally unable to keep up with the details of administration,
has ceded sweeping power to the public administration and has per-
mitted the President to acquire without delegation greatly enhanced
powers. (This, it may be noted, makes the Supreme Court's decision
in the Steel Seizure Case6 s of 1952 seem to be a curious anachronism.)
The House Armed Services Committee put the matter effectively and
accurately in 1962 in these words:
To any student of government, it is eminently clear that the role
of the Congress in determining national policy, defense or other-
wise, has deteriorated over the years. More and more the role of
Congress has come to be that of a sometimes querulous but essen-
tially kindly uncle who complains while furiously puffing on his
pipe but who finally, as everyone expects, gives in and hands over
the allowance, grants the permission, or raises his hand in blessing,
and then returns to the rocking chair for another year of som-
nolence broken only by an occasional anxious glance down the
avenue and a muttered doubt as to whether he had done the
right thing.'
There can be little question about a decline in the legislative role of
Congress. This has meant that, if Congress was to have anything but
160. As John K. Jessup once put it, the political States are more important as a
source of Senators than as a repository of sovereignty. Jessup, A Political Role for
the Corporation, FORTUNE, Aug., 1952, at 154.
161. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMWNT 11 (1885).
162. Id. at 36.
163. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1954).
164. H.R. REP. No. 1406, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1962). See Miller, Presidential
Power to Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional Decision-
Making, 43 N.C.L. Rev. 502 (1965).
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a nominal function, it would have to find a new role. This it seems
to be doing in the area of participation in administrative activities.
"Needed in the modern state" says Professor Samuel Huntington, "are
means to control, check, supplement, stimulate, and ameliorate this
bureaucracy."' 65 It has now become obvious that the judiciary cannot
adequately accomplish this task. If control of the bureaucracy is to be
done, save in a few spectacular instances, judicial review is too episodic
and sporadic, too dependent on the accident of litigation and the short-
comings of the adversary system'66 to permit the sustained oversight
that is apparently necessary. As George B. Galloway has said, our
solution has been to look for Congress to assume new functions; not
legislation but control of administration is becoming its primary duty.'67
Not that it does it well or systematically; far from it. Save for the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and one or two other instances, 68
Congress does not have the resources requisite to an adequate oversight
of the public administration. It is trying, but the results are not
promising. The point was well made in 1967 by Lord Jackson of
Burnley in his presidential address to the British Association for the
Advancement of Science; speaking of the British Parliament, he said
that "Parliament needs to find a way of getting to grips more effec-
tively with scientific and technological issues ;" if it does not, he went
on to say, "its functions would be little more than endorsing, on limited
information, decisions already taken at ministerial level."' 69 The same
may be said of Congress.
The other facet of separation of powers is the judiciary. No
longer an authoritative faculty of political economy, in that it no longer
makes constitutional decisions of an economic nature, the Supreme
Court vis-A-vis the public administration operates as an interpreter of
statutes. This means, among other things: (a) its decisions are always
subject to possible review and reversal by Congress; this in fact has
happened, often in economic matters, on a number of occasions in
recent years; and (b) its administrative-law decisions tend to establish
only a specific or particular norm rather than a general principle; in
other words, a court decision about agency A is likely to be ignored
completely by agency B - and may in fact be resisted, even ignored,
165. Huntington, Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century, in THE
CONGRESS AND AMERICA'S FUTuRE 24 (D. Truman ed. 1965).
166. See Miller & Scheflin, supra note 20, at 536-45, for a statement of the short-
comings of the adversary system.
167. G. GALLOWAY, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CONGRESS 166 (1953). See
generally J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL oF ADMINISTRATION (1964).
168. See H.P. GREEN & A. ROStNTHAL, GOVERNMENT OP THE ATOM: THE INTE-
GRATION OP POWERS (1963).
169. Quoted in The Times (London), Aug. 31, 1967, at 4, col. 3.
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by agency A !170 Furthermore, for one reason or another the Justices
have admitted incompetence to deal with many of the highly complex
issues of the technological era, and thus have deferred to the adminis-
trative judgment;171 and until recently 172 have also made it all but
impossible for anyone to challenge a federal expenditure in court.7 3
The conclusion is that both Congress and the Supreme Court have
abdicated to the "other branch" in recent decades.
With the locus of governmental power having moved to the public
administration (the "executive branch"), another centralizing tendency
has become evident: toward the consolidation of power in the institu-
tionalized office of the Presidency (the Bureau of the Budget is the
most important segment). The office is both one man and many; it is
personalized and bureaucratized. Probably it is accurate, as Richard
Neustadt has said in Presidential Power, that the power of the Chief
Executive is mainly that of persuasion and that he looks out on a
collection of "feudalities" within the executive-administrative branch,
but there can be no question that he is also a binding force. "In many
spheres of action the executive establishment can scarcely move except
as it invokes the President.' 1 7  He legitimates action of the public
administration in his constitutional capacity of Chief of State and Head
of Government. Slowly but seemingly surely, this is leading toward an
accretion of power in the Office of the Chief Executive. The increased
activities of government, often in the area of economic planning, have
created the need for consistency or congruency in policy. Where that
takes place, when it does (which is far less than some imagine), it is
by little-known and little-sung administrators who man the several
offices in the institutionalized Presidency - men with a "passion for
anonymity" who exercise considerable power. The need in economic
planning, as Professor Oul~s has said, 7 ' is for coordination of public
policy; to the extent that it exists, it is accomplished by staff officers
(mainly in the Bureau of the Budget). This does not mean that full
coordination occurs. One of the as yet unsolved problems of the
Positive State is the lack of consistency in policy. But it does mean
170. There is no such thing as a "common" or "general" law of judicial review.
Cf. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 311 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941).
This can also be seen in the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" in administrative law.
See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVg LAW § 30 (1951).
172. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), holding that a taxpayer has standing
to challenge a federal spending program where it is alleged that the program is in
derogation of a specific constitutional prohibition.
173. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
174. Neustadt, Politicians and Bureaucrats, in Tug CONGRESS AND AMRICA'S
FUTUR4 109 (D. Truman ed. 1955).
175. F. OULkS, supra note 87, at 28-29.
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that coordination is greater now than in the past - and will likely
be even more in the future. One of the unstated effects of the institu-
tion of PPBS (planning-programming-budgeting system - in other
words, the application of systems analysis to the governmental process)
throughout government is that it will lead toward that greater con-
gruency in policy now so lacking." 6 The development will be fought
by the leaders of the feudal baronies within the executive-administra-
tive branch, just as Congress is fighting its diminished role, but the
likelihood of success seems small.
(4) Next in this adumbration of the characteristics of the Positive
State concerns both the nature of law and the role of the judiciary: the
politicization of law and the legal process. The Positive State is the
"administrative state," and is exemplified by broad discretion vested
in the administrators - whether they are department heads (for ex-
ample, the military secretaries in government-contract matters), com-
missioners of the regulatory agencies, the President himself and his
advisers, or most other parts of what was once called the "headless
fourth branch of government" but what may more circumspectly be
called the "executive-administrative branch." Within that branch is to
be seen that merger of law and politics in action that travels under the
banner of "public law."
Writing in 1962 about the regulatory commissions, Judge Henry
J. Friendly maintained that "the basic deficiency, which underlies and
accounts for the most serious troubles of the agencies, is the failure to
'make law' within the broad confines of the agencies' charters" and that
"once this basic deficiency is remedied, other ills will largely cure them-
selves; and that shadows and miseries will long be with the agencies
if it is not.""' 7 Judge Friendly's point was that much of the "justified
dissatisfaction" with administration is the failure of administrators
and others "to develop standards sufficiently definite to permit decisions
to be fairly predictable and the reasons for them understood."' The
indictment is sound, although the Judge's remedy may be faulted for
being too heavily weighted on the side of making the public adminis-
tration look like an idealized version of the judiciary. What it means,
in brief, is this: administrators, having been invested with the power
to regulate "in the public interest," have failed to produce workable
meanings of that term.179 In other words, power to regulate in the
public interest has given the administrator uncanalized discretion and,
176. See Neustadt, supra note 174, at 103, for a statement of the problems of
getting consistency among the administrative agencies. But the trend seems clear,
and PPBS will help to accelerate centralized control.
177. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AcENCIES viii (1962).
178. Id. at 5-6.
179. See Miller, supra note 149.
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of even more importance, has transformed many of the commissions
and departments into little political arenas. By establishing the agen-
cies, Congress merely succeeded in transferring the political battle-
ground westerly along Pennsylvania Avenue. A result is government
by elite - by putative expert.
Public economic policy, insofar as it is determined administra-
tively, tends to be the outcome of the conflicts of political forces.
Government institutions are at once the object of that struggle and
one of the participants in the contest. The aim is to control the flow
of public policy decisions. Particularistic interests, such as the super-
corporations, energize political forces and battle for influence in that
process. Regulation and administration, particularly in the higher
echelons, tends to be politics. In the lower rungs, where so-called
"low-visibility" decisions are made, less discretion may exist (and less
politics may be involved). Political scientists have by and large accepted
the notion that regulation is a political process. " 'Politics' is now
rightly viewed," says Professor Marver Bernstein, "not only as un-
avoidable, but as essential to the formulation of policies that bear some
rational relation to economic and technological conditions."' 8 ° This,
however, means that, as Charles A. Horsky has put it, ours is em-
phatically "a government of men, not of laws."'' Law has been
merged into the political process.
The point is fundamental - and of the most profound significance.
Law increasingly has become a purposive tool for the furtherance of
desired goals rather than a set of interdictory commands limiting the
discretion of administrators or channeling their decisions. If adminis-
tration is politics, the received notions, the conventional wisdom about
the nature of law, become suspect and require re-examination in the
light of the imperatives of the day. Legal scholars have not as yet
accomplished this necessary task, but do it they must if ever a philo-
sophical reconciliation of law and politics is to be forthcoming and if
ever the administrative process is to receive legitimacy in the light of
the historical Constitution.8 2
(5) Fifth of the prominent features of the Positive State is the
active encouragement by the State of associational activity. The point
is discernible in several ways. One has already been mentioned: when
180. Bernstein, The Regulatory Process: A Framework for Analysis, 26 LAW &
CONThMP. PROB. 329, 341 (1961).
181. C. HORSKY, THt WASHINGTON LAWYER 68 (1952).
182. Compare Lasswell & McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspec-
tive, 19 U. FLA. L. Rev. 486 (1967), with Miller, Public Law and the Obsolescence
of the Lawyer, 19 U. FLA. L. Riv. 514 (1967), and Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy
Decision Process: Alternative Thinking and the Predictive Function, 33 Gto. WASH.
L. Rsv. 318 (1964).
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in 1886 the Supreme Court, without argument, assumed that the cor-
poration was a person within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment,18 3 it at one stroke brought at least a measure of legitimacy to
that form of business enterprise. Other Court decisions follow the
same trail; for example, the High Bench has said that bigness by itself
is no violation of the antitrust laws,"8 4 thereby making it possible for
the supercorporation to grow.
More recently, the Court has recognized a "right of association"
protected by the first amendment, although this relates mainly to ethnic
groups. 8 5 It has also given the constitutional imprimatur to union
activity in the cases upholding the National Labor Relations Act and
amendments.' This means that the union, as a part of the corporate
community, has been approved (encouraged) by all three branches
of government.
For its own part, Congress not only goes along with interpreta-
tions of the antitrust laws (not always, as the recent Bank Merger Act
indicates),l"7 but also legislates to further union activity. Furthermore,
it has developed over the years a system of subsidies to private associa-
tions - corporations, for one, but others as well.' And at times it
has created corporations for the attainment of specified ends; the Com-
munications Satellite Corporation is a classic example of the techno-
corporate state in action, for it is an arm of the state. It most clearly
exemplifies the corporate state, American style.
(6) The last in this listing of prominent features of the Positive
State may be stated in the form of a trend: toward the progressive
blurring of what purportedly is public and what supposedly is private
in the relationships of government and business. The development may
be seen in a number of ways: the reciprocal participation by business
leaders in government decisions and by government officials in business
decisions; the dependency of large segments of the business community
on government for its economic viability; judicial recognition of the
corporate way of doing business, with a consequent halting beginning
toward the "public-izing" of private business through the imposition
of constitutional norms; and the employment by government of corpora-
tions, profit and nonprofit, as administrative devices.
183. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
184. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
185. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See D. HORN, GRouPs AND THZ
CONSTITUTION (1956) ; Miller, The Constitution and the Voluntary Association: Some
Notes Toward A Theory, to be published in a future volume of NOMOS, the publi-
cation of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy.
186. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. III, 1968).
188. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDY-
EFFxcT PROGRAMS OF THI U.S. GOVgRNM4NT (Joint Comm. Print 1965).
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What is to be seen here is the gradual merger of political and
economic power. Government and business are growing closer to-
gether. There can be little doubt that, with the proliferation of govern-
ment and with the reciprocal needs of each institution for the other,
a progressive blurring of the alleged line between public and private is
taking place. One consequence, to be discussed in the next section, is
the extent to which (if at all) constitutional norms do - or should -
apply to the supercorporations. If such ostensibly private organizations
as political parties can be made subject to the Constitution, can the
principle be extended?
Another name for the merger of public and private is the "govern-
ment-business" partnership. Businessmen recognize that such a rela-
tionship exists. Witness, in this connection, the following statements:
Since the early part of this century we have been developing a
new form of public-private society .... Call it what you will, the
fact remains that this kind of government is here to stay, and those
who would accomplish almost anything of public interest must
work with the government. I say work "with it," not "for" it.l"9
There is an old saying that facts have a way of outrunning
thoughts. The facts of today's world are such that the old atti-
tudes of many businessmen toward government, and the old atti-
tudes of many government people toward business, are no longer
relevant. There can be no longer any question as to whether or
not these two groups can or will work together; they must work
together. The vast changes that are sweeping our nation make
cooperation a necessity. 9 °
Those are statements by prominent businessmen; they exemplify the
new philosophy. But if there is a government-business partnership,
and that cannot be gainsaid, then it by no means should be considered
an unalloyed blessing. The rise of the Positive State has ameliorated,
if not solved, some of the pressing problems of yesterday; but it has
brought with it, particularly in its relations with the supercorporations,
a number of equally difficult problems. If the price of liberty is eternal
vigilance, then the price of good government is eternal concern. Basic-
ally the problems of the techno-corporate state are constitutional. But
some of them are principally economic, others mainly political, while
still others are questions of law. They are lumped together in the next
section, because in fact each of them has characteristics that cut across
politics and economics and law - and other disciplines as well (such
189. Melvin H. Baker, Chairman of the Board of National Gypsum Company and
a Vice-President of the National Association of Manufacturers, quoted in Christian
Science Monitor, July 2, 1959, at 12, col. 7.
190. Frank N. Ikard, President of the American Petroleum Institute in Where
Business and Government Meet, 7 PETROLEUM TODAY, Fall, 1966, at 25.
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as philosophy and psychology and sociology). And they are listed,
with only brief discussion, although it is emphasized that each poses
difficult and complex problems of its own; each deserves treatment as
a separate article (or volume).
V. SOME BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE TECHNO-
CORPORATE STATE
If it is agreed that the techno-corporate state is an actuality (at
least a potentiality) in the United States, the system has evolved in
an ad hoc manner. This new constitutional order did not arise because
of some Machiavellian conspiracy of people (technocrats or "creeping
socialists") bent on subverting the wisdom of the Founding Fathers,
but because of certain felt necessities - hydraulic pressures that de-
veloped slowly and that found a vent in the programs of the Positive
State. In so doing, other problems have arisen - and old ones have
remained, thus illustrating the fact that there are no final solutions
to human problems but only a succession of partial answers. The
problems set forth below are listed without more than passing refer-
ence to what should be the initial problem - that of answering the
question, What is a problem? In other words, how do we know that
given situations are problems? That must be answered at the outset,
if for no other reason than that the means and criteria by which prob-
lems are identified may determine the answer. If, as was asserted
above, facts do not speak for themselves, neither do problems. The
identification of problems will take more than a commitment to intel-
lectual ad hoc-ism, of waiting for situations to develop, and then
treating each problem as a discrete example mainly by looking back-
ward to see where man has been. 191 The pragmatic approach will not
do, whatever variation of the 17 types of pragmatism one follows.
(During the early years of the Kennedy administration, the highest
accolade one could get was that he was a "hard-headed pragmatist,"
which even in this short span of time seems strangely awry.) The
trouble with pragmatism is that it provides no goals; a pragmatist
really doesn't know where he is going or wants to go, only that he is
on his way. At the very time, thus, that science and technology have
created the urgent need to manage change within the confines of the
techno-corporate state, which includes the clarification of goals at the
barest minimum, some sort of ad hoc recognition and dealing with
problems is still employed. Whatever one thinks of Vietnam, it surely
is a classic example of where that type of "thinking" leads: a problem
is not a problem until it is a crisis, until, that is, it has reached the
191. See Miller, Book Review, 15 STAN. L. Rov. 138 (1962); Mayo & Jones,
supra note 182.
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point where one can no longer "retain his options"; it is then too late
to deal with it properly. What this suggests is that "empiricism" or
"ad hoc-ism" can no longer be the principal means of proceeding with-
in the framework of the policies of the techno-corporate state. The
initiation of "program budgeting" within government is a recognition
of the validity of that statement, although PPBS itself presents some
rather obvious shortcomings. 19 2 Be that as it may, what are the prob-
lems of the modern state, that state we have called "techno-corporate"?
They include the following.
(1) Inflation: Programs designed to enhance employment oppor-
tunities, to provide for economic growth, and to fulfill the general
objectives of the Employment Act, have the tendency, thus far unsolved,
of causing inflationary spirals in the economy. The "voluntary" con-
trols so far imposed by the American system of economic planning
have not yet been able to stem the tide. In the offing, accordingly,
are more stringent economic controls - in prices, in wages, in mone-
tary affairs. Should they come, there is little doubt that the Supreme
Court would uphold any constitutional challenge to their validity.
More control, if and when it does come, will be dependent on close
cooperation among all the important economic power centers of the
nation - government, the corporations, the unions, the farmers, to
name only the more prominent. 198
(2) A tendency toward autarchy: The question is whether the
actions taken to further internal economic integration that are charac-
teristic of the Positive State can be made without suffering external
disintegration. Government intervention into the economy, made for
reasons of national security and economic well-being, may lead toward
economic nationalism. Trade becomes an instrument of national policy.
Employment is made secure and the enterprise maintains viability by
"exporting unemployment."' 94 A qualification might be noted here in
the tendency of the nations of the North Atlantic to form the "rich
man's club." There may, in other words, be economic intergration
among those nations - at the expense of the rest of the world, prin-
cipally the developing nations (the poverty-rows of the world).'
(3) The State as a "group person": The Positive State, as a
collectivity, is the hypostatization of the public interest - and the
192. Not least of these is the assumption that objectivity is attainable by those who
use the system.
193. See Miller, Foreign Trade and the "Security State": A Study in Conflicting
National Policies, 7 J. PuB. L. 37 (1958), for a delineation of this and other short-
comings of the Positive State.
194. Id.
195. Cf. H. CLEVELAND, THE ATLANTIC IDEA AND ITS EUROPEAN RIVALS (1966).
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public interest is greater than the arithmetical sum of the private in-
terests of the nation. Government in the modern era has to some
degree taken on a momentum of its own, separate from and greater
than the individual interests of the nation. President John F. Kennedy
put the thought in express terms in 1962, in the context of a prior
assertion by the Secretary of Labor concerning the public's interest in
collective bargaining negotiations. In response to a question at a press
conference, the President said: "These companies are free and the
unions are free. All we [the Executive] can try to do is to indicate
to them the public interest which is there. After all, the public interest
is the sum of the private interests, or perhaps it's even sometimes a
little more. In fact, it is a little more. '190 With these words, the
President articulated a theory of government basically different from
that which historically existed (at least in theory). Within the con-
cept of the public interest as so stated by the Chief Executive may be
found both the essence of positive government and many of the prob-
lems inherent in the new posture of officialdom vis-A-vis the persons
and groups of American society. It also posed directly the question of
who was senior or dominant in the government-business partnership.
The state as a "group-person," to use Gierke's label,' 97 poses
dangers of the first order of significance. Amaury de Riencourt main-
tained several years ago that the United States is a "human society"
that "is not merely an aggregate of separate human individuals; it is
an entity of its own right, endowed with a life of its own, a collective
life greater and far more lasting than the lives of the separate in-
dividuals who belong to it .... ."'1 a formulation not dissimilar from
that of President Kennedy. The essential danger in the state as group-
person was pointed out in 1933 by Ernest Barker:
If we make groups real persons, we shall make the national State
a real person. If we make the State a real person, with a real will,
we make it indeed a Leviathan - a Leviathan which is not an
automaton, like the Leviathan of Hobbes, but a living reality.
When its will collides with other wills, it may claim that, being
the greatest, it must and shall carry the day; and its supreme
will may thus become a supreme force. If and when that happens,
not only may the State become the one real person and the one
true group, which eliminates or assimilates others: it may also
become a mere personal power which eliminates its own true
nature as a specific purpose directed to Law or Right.'99
196. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1962, at 14, col. 5 (emphasis added).
197. 0. GIMRKs, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OP SOCIETY, 1500-1800 (paper ed.
1957) ; see D. LLOYD, THE IDEA o1: LAW ch. 8 (1964).
198. A. RIENCOURT, THE COMING CAESARS 9-10 (paper ed. 1957).
199. Barker, Introduction to 0. GIERKE, supra note 197, at lxxxv.
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Just as "the" corporation has become a group-person, in Earl Latham's
label, "an anthropomorphic superperson whose reality is as real as that
of human beings,"2 ° so too has the state. As Barker says, when one
seeks to discover what lies behind the legal group-person and constitutes
its inner core, "[W]e must not talk of 'fictions' which hover in a
shadowy and unreal existence above a number of real individuals; we
must not talk of 'collections' or 'brackets' or contractual nets, flung
over so many individuals to bind them one to another in the bonds of
an impersonal nexus."20 1 What is to be seen is that two "group-
persons" exist: on the one hand, the supercorporations, and on the
other, the State. The net result, it is suggested, is not that these two
entities operate side-by-side, independent of each other, but that by slow
accretion the myriad transactions between them are creating a new
group-person, which we have called the "techno-corporate" state. When
President Kennedy said that the public interest was more than the
arithmetical sum of the private interests of the nation, he was recog-
nizing the state as group-person. Whenever actions are taken and
justified "in the national interest," without delineation of the reasons
therefore but merely "on faith," further tacit recognition is given to
the notion. American constitutional law, although not in explicit terms,
is in accord: the concept of raison d'etat is now a viable principle
of that law. 2'
What is postulated here is an extension of that idea, with govern-
ment (public) and the supercorporations (profit and some nonprofit)
acting in concert and forming a new type of American social order.
A fusion of political and economic power is taking place. The super-
corporations are not only "arms of the state," they are an integral
part of the American system of governance. The corporate managers
are not elected; they are nonrepresentative; but their decisions, how-
ever made, are as important as those of the elected representatives of
the people. The fusion of power means that the net result is a synthesis,
a decisional structure in government that is neither "public" nor
"private" but a combination of the two and different from both -
and, what is vastly more important, greater than either separately. The
state as group-person is the corporate state, American style. It pre-
sents all of the problems of centralized power that have plagued mankind
since the dawn of civilization. Some of these are listed below.
(4) Government by elites: The myth to the contrary notwith-
standing, for a number of reasons the "popular rule" model of govern-
200. Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SocIETY 319 n.9 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
201. Barker, supra note 199, at lxvi.
202. As in the cases upholding presidential action in time of war. See C. ROSSITER,
Th SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEI (1951).
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mental decisionmaking does not reflect reality. A feature of the techno-
corporate state is the control over decisions by an elite structure.
Galbraith discerns an elite in what he terms the "techno-structure" of
"the new industrial state," consisting of "all who bring specialized
knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making" ;2o3 mem-
bers of this elite are to be found in both public and private government.
The industrial system, he maintains, advances its interests with "sub-
tlety and power," and the techno-structure tends to become "an exten-
sion of those parts of the Federal bureaucracy - notably the armed
services, NASA, AEC and other agencies concerned with technological
development - on which it most depends. 2 °4 The values and goals
of the individual are bound together with those of the enterprise and
government through the operation of what is called the "principle
of consistency. "'20
Modern elite theory derives from Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano
Mosca; their conceptual scheme "comprises the following common
notions: in every society there is, and must be, a minority which rules
over the rest of society; this minority - the 'political class' or 'govern-
ing elite' composed of those who occupy posts of political command
and, more vaguely, those who can directly influence political decisions -
undergoes changes in its membership over a period of time, ordinarily
by the recruitment of new individual members from the lower strata
of society, sometimes by the incorporation of new social groups, and
occasionally by the complete replacement of the established elite by a
'counter-elite,' as occurs in revolution. 20  Contemporary scholars,
such as Harold D. Lasswell, concentrate upon the political elite. Lass-
well has defined this group in the following terms: "The political elite
comprises the power holders of a body politic. The power holders in-
clude the leadership and the social formations from which leaders
typically come, and to which accountability is maintained, during a
given period. 20 7 The power-holders of the techno-corporate state tend
to be the "technocrats," those with expertise in given complex areas -
the "engineers" that Veblen discussed or the "managers" that Burnham
visualized - but with a difference, a difference of great magnitude.208
What Veblen and Burnham saw was rule by an industrial elite. Build-
ing on Berle and Means' classic study, The Modern Corporation and
203. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 71.
204. Id. at 379.
205. Id. ch. XIV. Galbraith's observations should not be considered novel or
original insights. He draws on a vast literature, although with little acknowledgment.
206. T. BOTTOMORE, ELITES AND SOCIETY 6 (1964).
207. H. LASSWELL, D. LERNER & C. ROTHWELL, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY Or
ELITES (1952), quoted in T. BorrOMOR4, supra note 206, at 17.
208. J. BURNHAM, THIE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION (1960); T. VEBLEN, THE
ENGINEERS AND THE PRICe SYSTEM (1921).
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Private Property, °9 which set forth the thesis that the managers had
taken over control of the enterprise from the putative owners (the
stockholders), Burnham identifies two types of managers: "the scien-
tists and technologists, and the directors and co-ordinators of the process
of production. The latter are the managers par excellence ....
He thus differs from Galbraith, whose elitist theory is much more
amorphous.
However one describes the present American government, he must
come to grips with the question of elite theory and the part it plays.
If, as with C. Wright Mills, a "power elite ' 2 1 is postulated, there must
be considerable empirical data to buttress such assertions. But it takes
no large amount of factual underpinning to assert that the "popular
rule" model of government is at best an ideal and not a description of
reality. No more naive conception of government can exist than that
control by the citizenry is possible in the modern state. The same may
be said for the notion that democracy is protected and sustained by a
competition between elites, which balance and limit each other's power.
Jacques Ellul has put the matter well: "The organs of representative
democracy no longer have any other purpose than to endorse decisions
prepared by experts and pressure groups. 21 2 And further: "The de-
cision-making process consists of a complex mixture of personal judg-
ments, traditions, conflicts among the state's many organs, and pressures
from outside groups. '2 18
(5) Control of the elite: It is not a necessary conclusion, if
government by elite is accepted, that the modern (democratic) state
is the same' thing as an authoritarian state. Far from it. The rule of
law, despite its politicization (discussed above), is of some importance.
But what must be faced is that reliance on constitutions and juridical
processes will not do the necessary task of effecting control of the elite
in the sense of (a) preserving the values of a democratic society while
(b) permitting the urgent tasks of government to be accomplished.
Written constitutions are important but must be viewed as establishing
only the formal structure of government: what must be studied as well
is the system of effective control over important societal decisions. A
"living law" analysis 214 of the American constitutional order would
perforce have to take both factors into consideration; and would indi-
209. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 63. The Berle-Means thesis has been
challenged. See note 63 supra.
210. T. BOTTOMORS, supra note 206, at 73.
211. C.W. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
212. J. ELLUL, THE POLITICAL ILLUSION 138 (1967).
213. Id. at 139. Cf. A. Rost, THE POWER STRUCTURE: POLITICAL PROCESS IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1967).
214. See Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31 Gto. WASH.
L. Rev. 881 (1963).
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cate that those who actually control differ from those who purportedly
do so. Similarly, juridical processes are not sufficient to the need of
control of the elite, both because of the inherent inadequacies of the
adversary system (a system developed in the pre-industrial era, essen-
tially for the resolution of private law disputes) and because of the lack
of competence of the judges to understand or deal with the complex
issues of science and technology.
Discussed above has been the notion of the "politicization" of law.
The inadequacies of the formalized controls of the American constitu-
tional structure to operate as a meaningful check upon the techno-
structures of the techno-corporate state is further seen in the manner
in which the decisional process operates within government. The advent
of public law as the dominant part of the legal system means that
decisions within government tend to be those that are technically or
physically or economically possible. Law as normation - as inter-
dictory command - has little part to play in the higher reaches of the
public administration. Perhaps it has more in the lower rungs of the
bureaucracy, but even so, discretion in the administrator tends to be
the norm. Statutes do not administer themselves; it takes the active
intervention of officials to put them into operative reality. Whether
this is done rests, in final analysis, on whether the administrator wants
to do it. In other words, the power to do nothing is itself a major
power. Examples are numerous: to cite only two, one from a legisla-
tive command and the other from a judicial decree: (a) in 1964,
Congress enacted into law a bill, duly signed by the President, which
established an "administrative conference" to deal with .reforms of
administrative procedure ;211 it was only in 1968 that the conference
was formed by the President; that no one was particularly concerned
about this failure is itself a revealing illustration of the operation of
the American system, for if a powerful organization, such as the
American Bar Association, had been interested in seeing that the
legislative mandate was carried out, it seems likely that earlier action
would have been taken ;216 (b) in 1954, the Supreme Court decreed
that the Federal Power Commission had jurisdiction over certain as-
pects of the natural gas industry which the Commission theretofore
maintained it did not have ;217 several years later, the Commission had
215. 5 U.S.C. §§ 572-75 (1964). See Kramer & Miller, The Task of an Adminis-
trative Conference, 32 Gto. WASH. L. Rev. 169 (1963).
216. Statutes do not administer themselves. If there is any validity to the notion
of the "group basis of politics," see E. LATHAm, TH4 GROUP BASIS Or POLITICS (1952),
then it would seem likely that the influence of a powerful interest group, such as the
ABA, could help trigger executive action.
217. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
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still not exercised. that jurisdiction.21S There is little or nothing the
Court can do in the face of administrative failures of this type.
Within government, law as interdiction has tended to give way
to an instrumental view of law and the legal process. A degeneration
of the lawyer qua professional is evident today (perhaps it always
existed, for what little is known of history would seem so to indicate).
The legal specialist operates as a technician; he is called in, when the
occasion demands it, to put proposed or existing policies into the proper
legal form. Thus it is that State Department lawyers have no difficulty
in finding a legal basis for the Vietnam engagement. Similarly, govern-
ment lawyers have relied on a rather obscure case decided in 1940,
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 219 to justify a wide range of actions in
the area of federal contracts (because the Supreme Court decided that
a company did not have standing to challenge federal contracting
actions, the lawyers have said that this means that government has
carte blanche, that is, it operates under no constitutional restraints in
contracting).22 One is reminded, when pondering the merger of law
into politics, of the observation of Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1952
that he did not consider himself bound as a Justice by what he had
said as the President's lawyer - a revealing incident, indeed, for Mr.
Jackson as Attorney General had issued an opinion upholding the
validity of presidential seizure of private companies during a strike
(in order to keep them in production) ; in 1952, in the Steel Seizure
Case,22" ' involving President Truman's seizure of steel mills during a
strike, Mr. Jackson saw the problem differently. He concurred in the
judgment invalidating the seizure on constitutional grounds, a change
of mind interesting in present context because it so neatly illustrates
that the Attorney General's judgment is political, not "legal." '222 To
put it another way, it is a poor lawyer indeed who cannot find some
basis in law for what a policy-maker wishes to do. The lawyer within
government is often the handmaiden of the policy-maker. To emphasize
the point a recent paper by Dr. Emmanuel G. Mesthene, Executive
218. See the "Landis Report," reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TI CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT
ON REGULATORY AGENCIES To THE PRXSIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960).
219. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
220. This is a good example, be it noted, of instrumental or purposive legal coun-
selling by government lawyers - to further the interests of the bureaucracy, but not
necessarily the greater "public interest."
221. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
222. See id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). It is of course obvious that an
Attorney General who refused to give a President a ruling he desired would soon find
himself out of office. See also H. CUMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE
(1937), particularly the account of President Jackson's relationship with his Attorney
General; Miller, The Attorney General as the President's Lawyer, in L. HUSTON,
A. MILLER, S. KRISLOV, & R.G. DIXON, ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES 41 (1968).
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Director of Harvard University's Program on Science and Technology,
is apposite:
[T]he decision-maker's options ... [formerly] were legal options.
They were confined to interpretation of the rules. Political scientist
Robert Wood has made this point very clearly. The Politician...
always winds up asking the same fundamental questions, namely,
"Can we do this?" "Can we achieve our objectives in this way,
by this means?" In times when changes in the physical world
were very slow, governments operated as if such changes were
nonexistent. The ground rules were fixed, so that "Can we do
this ?" - Wood calls it the persistent political question - meant
"Do the rules allow it?" "Can we do it within the rules?" And
that is a question that lawyers answer. The politician's toolkit,
consequently, looked like a lawyer's. It contained "bargaining
skills, propaganda skills, and violence skills . . . . The political
order obviously required leaders and advisors with the lawyer's
special skill in value clarification, his verbal capacity, and his ex-
perience as an intellectual jobber and contractor who could make
a strong case wherever one was required." The effect of this
century's very rapid advance in science and technology is, in
Wood's view, that: "It subtly shifts the emphasis of the persistent
political question 'Can we do this?' from the consideration of legal
restraints to consideration of physical restraints. In these cir-
cumstances, it is not surprising that the ranks of senior career
personnel of the federal government, executives, advisors, and
specialists, have been increasingly filled by the scientific skill
group."
The question "Can we do this ?", in other words, today more
and more means, not "Can we do it within the rules ?", but "Can
we change the rules?" The physical conditions of political action
are no longer fixed, because science and technology can make physi-
cal changes occur much faster than they ever did in the past ...
As with politics, so with law, economics, culture, and society:
man's ability, derived from his technical prowess, to change his
physical world at will and massively removes the only heretofore
inviolable constraint on the shape and development of his social
systems and institutions. This poses an unprecedented challenge
to the public intelligence as society strives to achieve the wisdom
necessary to contain and channel the very great physical power
that science and technology have given to man .... 223
One need not mourn the desuetude of the lawyer, for no skill group
or profession has any vested interest in perpetual existence and power;
but what is to be pondered, and even mourned, is the desuetude of law.
223. Mesthene, Introduction to TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE at 6 (E;
Mesthene ed. 1967) (footnotes omitted).
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The restraining hand of law has been swallowed up in the question of
whether a given policy is physically and politically and economically
possible. Dean Don K. Price has said that the "main lines of our policy,
over the long run, are likely to be determined by scientific developments
that we cannot foresee, rather than by political [i.e., legal or consti-
tutional] doctrines that we can now state' 224 - thereby echoing
Mesthene and Wood. That may be so, but many of the policies that
are followed will be determined by the clash of a parallelogram of
conflicting political forces; those with political muscle or clout will be
able to trigger the official response. Decisions, hence, will continue to
be taken on an ad hoc basis, at the very time when that type of decision
making is no longer viable.
In sum, then, lawyers (the big corporate firms) operate as a part
of, and are used by, the elite. Wide delegations of power from Con-
gress to the public administration, the abdication of the Supreme
Court, the absence of any other institutional means of controlled
administrative discretion, the desuetude of the lawyer into a tech-
nician - all of these operate to contribute to the politicization of law
and the legal process. Thus one observes enormously costly programs
undertaken by the Executive without the semblance of public debate
(as the Apollo program of NASA); the engagement of the United
States in a major war without benefit of congressional midwifery;
flouting of at least the spirit of the antitrust laws by contracting policies
favoring big business; the manipulation of the money market by such
organs as the Federal Reserve Board (done in secret, without even
informing Congress) ; the rise of the "doctrine" of executive privilege,
whereby secrecy is maintained over administrative actions; a failure
or refusal to adhere to congressional mandates or judicial decrees -
these are but some of the instances that can be cited in support of the
proposition of the decline of law. 225 The signals the elite - public and
private - listen to seldom come from the lawyer qua lawyer.
(6) Coordination of Government policy: Given the greatly in-
creased number of activities conducted by Government, an obvious need
arises for making the programs as consistent as possible. At present,
there is no formal, institutionalized means by which this can be done;
when it is accomplished, it is through the operations of the Bureau of
the Budget and various ad hoc inter-agency committees - more ex-
amples of ad hoc-ism in government. Many programs are not con-
224. D. PRIcE, Tug SCIRN TIvIc ESTAT 186 (1965).
225. Cf. Miller, supra note 182. It is ironical that at the very time of the ex-
ponential growth of public law, the idea of law as interdiction is becoming moribund.
Compare W. FRIXDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIXTY (1959), with D. LLOYD, THi
IDEA OF LAW (1964).
FALL 19681
59
Miller: Toward the Techno-Corporate State - An Essay in American Constitu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
gruent today, particularly as administered, a situation that at some
time will become intolerable and will lead to greater control measures
being instituted. Federal purchasing policies, for example, run counter
to other programs and policies ;226 big business is favored over small
business - for good and sufficient reasons, procurement officers pursue
policies that have the effect of undercutting the antitrust laws. How
this will be resolved cannot be forecast, although one would be safe in
suggesting that nothing serious will be done by government to hamper
or hinder the productive capacity of the large corporate enterprise.
The supercorporation is too important to be subjected to significant
interference with its activities. But consistency or congruency is be-
coming a necessity (which likely foretells the even greater marasmus
of the antitrust laws; even now antitrust administration is noteworthy
for proceeding against the inconsequential, as witness the announce-
ment in November 1967 that action was being taken against syndicates
that distribute comic strips).
(7) The nature of human freedom: The rise of the supercor-
porations and the techno-corporate state has undercut the historical
individualistic basis of law. The individual qua individual has lost
most of whatever significance he may once have had. A person, for
the most part, derives importance only as a member of a group. In
economics, this was clear as long ago as the turn of the century; at
that time, John D. Rockefeller maintained that large-scale organization
"has revolutionized the way of doing business .... Individualism has
gone, never to return. ' 227 Replacing the individual is a collectivity -
as the important unit of society and as the basis of politics. 2 8 As
Jacques Ellul has put it, "in an organized democracy the normal way
for a citizen to express himself is through his group. Each citizen
must belong to one or several groups ... "22 Or, as Willy Ley has
recently said, "in a technological society, which is to say a society
based on technology, work must be done by many people together, and
consequently every individual is destined to be part of a group, to say
we instead of I." The need, says Ley, is not for more Beethovens -
men able to work by themselves - but for more Wernher von Brauns,
men whose genius talks in "collective terms. 230
Consider the meaning of this for the nature of human freedom.
Freedom in a society dominated by big government and big business
226. See Miller & Pierson, Observations on the Consistency of Federal Procurement
Policies with Other Governmental Policies, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 277 (1964).
227. Quoted in 1 A. NzVINS, JOHN D. ROCKEF4LLXR 622 (1940).
228. Compare E. LATHAM, supra note 216, with Ward, The Ideal of Individualism
and the Reality of Organization, in THt BusINss ESTABLISHMENT 37 (E. Cheit
ed. 1964).
229. J. ELLUL, THE POLITICAL ILLUSION 178 (1967).
230. Quoted in 0. FALLACI, IF THE SUN DIEs 201-02 (1967).
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and big science means the freedom to decide which group to join -
and not much more. Moreover, it is clear that all do not have even
that attenuated freedom (to join a group) in the Western democracies.
The elite tends to be drawn from the "upper classes. '23' Negroes find
it difficult to find employment or to join unions.232 Here it is meet to
note that the Supreme Court, which in recent years has outwardly
been greatly concerned with civil libertarian problems (i.e., the prob-
lems of the individual vis-A-vis the state), has in fact and in effect been
creating a constitutional law of group association. Ready examples
are the Negro organizations23 3 and religious associations. 234
In sum, then, freedom tends to become Hegelian, that is, the
freedom to do what one should do - as determined by the elite.
(8) Legitimacy: The supercorporation has only a thin claim to
legitimacy in the American constitutional order. Power, to be legiti-
mate under the Constitution, must ultimately be responsible and
accountable and must be derived from the consent of the governed.235
In English history, corporate legitimacy came from recognition by
the sovereign; but the corporate charter, freely granted by com-
plaisant states, is hardly a substitute. As centers of political power,
corporations, being new to the social arena, require theoretical legitimi-
zation. To Carl Joachim Friedrich, legitimacy is the right or title to
rule,2 36 a concept which in the past has been founded on a number of
beliefs (which in turn are based on a range of religious and meta-
physical notions). These include a magical belief in descent from the
gods, blood descent which equates rule with the right of property, the
divine right, custom and tradition, and by those who are being ruled
expressing a preference for the ruler (or the rule) and by voting for
him (or it). The ruler in the American system achieves legitimacy
because he has been voted into office. But those who control the super-
corporations are in fact oligarchs who voted themselves into office;
they are self-appointed and self-perpetuating, much like college boards
of trustees. As Dean Edward S. Mason has said: "Who selected these
men, if not to rule over us, at least to exercise vast authority, and to
whom are they responsible? The answer to the first question is quite
clearly: they selected themselves. The answer to the second is, at best,
nebulous. This, in a nutshell, constitutes the problem of legitimacy. '237
231. T. BOTTOMORE, supra note 206.
232. See M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MZNT (1966).
233. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
234. The exception to this is the area of administration of the criminal law.
235. See W. MITCHELL, THE AMERICAN POLITY (1962).
236. C. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND His GOVERNMENT 233 (1963).
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Now, as Dean Mason goes on to state, "some of our best people are
oligarchs, '238 but that means that we are ruled by benevolent despots -
to the extent that the supercorporation is an instrument of governance.
If legitimacy is a problem for the domestic corporation, it is even
more so for the multinational firm. Professor Kenneth E. Boulding
has put the matter well: "The international corporation faces a pecu-
liarly difficult problem in establishing its universal legitimacy. Within
a nation, the corporation achieves a certain legitimacy simply from the
fact that it is incorporated by some public body .... The international
corporations do not have even this shred of legitimacy, simply because
there is no international body that can charter them. The international
corporation, that is, operates in a kind of governmental vacuum, and
it has to depend for its survival on legitimacies which are derived from
special skill, from bargaining power, or from the prestige of the national
government with which it is most closely associated." '  The "Dela-
wares" of the planet, such as Panama and Honduras, do, of course,
readily grant charters to firms doing business in world commerce,
but that is hardly a substitute for chartering by, for example, the
United Nations.
The economists tend to accept or ignore the question of corporate
legitimacy. Witness Robert Heilbroner: "The position of business
within society was never more solidly entrenched. By this I mean that
its legitimacy is now virtually complete, its acceptance without ques-
tion. For perhaps the first time in American history there is no longer
any substantial intellectual opposition to the system of business nor
any serious questioning of its economic privileges and benefits."24
That statement was made in context of an analysis of the supercorpora-
tions; Heilbroner equates absence of dissent with consent - which
may or may not be valid. Other economists, such as Galbraith and
Schumpeter and Kaplan, tend to believe that in the long run "the activi-
ties of the giant business firm tend to bring about a more nearly
optimum allocation of resources, raise the level and reduce inequality
in the distribution of income, and promote the secular rise in total
output."24' They thus ignore the question of where the corporate
oligarchs got their right or title to rule and thereby illustrate how
a unilinear perspective (i.e., through economics alone) of the super-
corporation fails to meet some essential questions.
238. Id. at 6.
239. Quoted in Martyn, Multinational Corporations in a Nationalistic World,
CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec., 1965, at 15. See A. MILLR, supra note 18, ch. 5.
240. R. HEILBRONER, supra note 6.
241. Baratz, Corporate Giants and the Power Structure, 9 W. POL. Q. 406, 407
(1956).
[VOL. 14: p. 1
62
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/1
"TECH NO-CORPORATE" STATE?
(9) Accountability: If legitimacy is a problem of the techno-
corporate state, then accountability is much more so. Accountability -
the need "to answer in another place" for decisions and actions -
is central to American constitutionalism. Discussed above, under the
rubric of the politicization of law, has been the idea of the accountability
of public officials; it was there suggested that they operated with only
minimal guidance from that set of external constraints known as law.
Turning now to the officers of the private bureaucracies, what may
be said of them? We begin with a recent statement by John F. A.
Taylor: "[T]heir [the corporate managers] power is arbitrary quite
independently of the motives which guide them in their performances.
Nothing is gained by supposing the modern captain of industry wicked
or malevolent. Unread in the arts of Machiavelli, he could school
philosophers and princes in the real conditioning of power."24 Here
again, law as interdictory command has little part to play: discretion,
which knows few bounds so far as law is concerned, is the rule. That
discretion is exercised in an arena of conflicting drives from other
power centers - unions and government and the general public. No
doubt it is true that there is adherence to standards of conduct precisely
demanded by the legal system, but as lawyers know, the law is not very
certain; it leaves a great deal of flexibility and freedom to manuever.
Under the classical theory of economics, still part of the accepted
wisdom of many in the fraternity of professional economists, the busi-
nessman does not have to worry about ethical or legal behavior. Acting
as the personification of "economic man," bent ceaselessly on maximiz-
ing profit, he is considered to be controlled by the "market." The inter-
vention of external command or government is not necessary, simply
because the "invisible hand" magically translates the pursuit of selfish
gain into the overall public good. The market, in other words, is said
to operate as an external standard. By merely being, it performs its
vital societal.function.
That this simplistic model of politico-economic behavior no longer
is adequate is quite clear. (Likely it never was, except in the published
lucubrations of economists who sat secure in their ivory aeries taking
an Olympian and magisterial view of human affairs.) Something else
is needed in an economy dominated by corporate giants, operating in
the techno-corporate state. That "something" traditionally has been
the law. In a certain degree, law may be said to operate to limit cor-
porate decisionmaking. For example, the antitrust laws apparently do
circumscribe some corporate actions; labor laws require bargaining
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with the union over a range of disputes; and the restraints of law
operate to some extent in protecting the public (pure food and drug
laws, automobile safety standards, etc.). The point, however, is that
in the higher reaches of corporate activity, law plays little or no part.
The problem this poses is twofold: How may accountability be effected
with respect to (a) the internal segments of the corporate community
and (b) the external segments, including the public at large? The first
is essentially a matter of due process of law, to use constitutional lan-
guage; the latter is a matter of how to see to it that true "public
interest" decisions are made.
Only brief attention may be given in this Article to these difficult
questions. As to due process, we may begin with a recent statement of
sociologist William M. Evan:
There is a growing awareness of the need for restricting the
powers of the corporation. In particular, it is being argued that
the courts and the legislatures should extend constitutional guar-
antees of procedural due process to the corporation or that cor-
porations should develop their own "supplementary constitutional
systems." The venerable doctrine of due process . . . includes a
complex of procedural safeguards against the exercise of arbitrary
and unlimited power. These norms seek to insure that disputes
are resolved impartially and fairly. This complex of norms in-
cludes the right of all parties to a conflict to be heard, the right to
confront witnesses, to cross-examine them, and to introduce evi-
dence in one's behalf.2 43
Should procedural due process be applied to the supercorporations, it
would be applicable to those decisions that touch and concern members
of the corporate community directly. Included would be employees,
suppliers, and dealers. Some are already protected; for example, mem-
bers of the union have attained it by legislative mandate. But the
question that is posed by the problem of accountability is broader -
should due process become a constitutional command directed at cor-
porate managers and should it be imposed judicially?
Taking those questions in reverse order, what due process that
does exist now within the corporate community has by and large been
the result of legislative commands - labor laws, the Automobile
Dealers Day in Court Act,244 etc. That is a limited coverage. If the
principle is to be extended, as Evan suggests, should it be by more
legislation? Some so believe; for example, Professor Harry Welling-
243. Evan, Organization Man and Due Process of Law, 26 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL Rzv.
540, 545 (1961).
244. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
[VOL. 14 : p. 1
64
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/1
"TECHNO-CORPORATE" STATE?
ton of the Yale Law School. 45 He argues that it would place too
large a burden on the courts, and that it would be otherwise im-
proper to ask them to take on a larger jurisdiction - that of the units
of private governance, the supercorporations. The argument has merit,
but can be countered, even overcome. If the sovereign state of Delaware
is subject to the limitations of the fourteenth amendment, then why
should not the "corporate state" of DuPont or General Motors? By
applying the Constitution to such entities - by "constitutionalizing"
the supercorporation - it may be possible to retain the benefits flowing
from the private ownership of business while simultaneously attaining
a higher degree of fairness in the social order. Requiring that the
supercorporations, which, it will be remembered, are defined to include
the labor unions, follow due process norms may help maintain a wall
of separation between state and corporation that legislation, simply
because it has to be broader and more encompassing, would tend to
eliminate. We have posited above the emergence of the techno-corporate
state as a "group-person"; imposition of accountability to the corpora-
tions through legislation would, in other words, further that develop-
ment, whereas the more limited judicial activity would slow it down.
The apposite analogy is the federal system: there judicial decisions,
the myth to the contrary, have had far less to do with changes in tradi-
tional federalism than have massive taxing and spending programs
by Congress.
However, if due process of law is to become the way in which a
measure of accountability is brought to the corporate enterprise, one
major constitutional leap must be taken, namely, the concept of "state
action" will have to be dropped by the Supreme Court, at least in part.
The Constitution has since the Civil Rights Cases24 of 1883 been said
to run against governments only. The need is to recognize that govern-
ments can be both official and private. Some signs of such a develop-
ment are already evident. Political parties, once thought to be private,
are now considered sufficiently public to have the Constitution applied
to the conduct of primary elections.247 The 1946 decision of the
Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama.48 directly applied the Constitu-
tion to a corporation (the Gulf Shipbuilding Company); it exists as
a time bomb ticking away in the United States Reports ready for use
when thought appropriate. That that time may be imminent is a
possible conclusion from the clutch of recent decisions relating to race
245. Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action,"
70 YALt L.J. 345 (1961).
246. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
247. E.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
248. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See Pekelis, Private Governments and the Federal
Constitution, in LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 91 (M. Konvitz ed. 1950).
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relations (the "sit-in" cases, principally) in which the Court has all
but erased the state action concept.249 The bomb exploded, at least
partially, in a decision in May, 1968, Amalgamated Food Employees
Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,25 holding that a privately owned
shopping center could not prevent picketing by union members on its
premises; this decision extended Marsh v. Alabama. (One member of
the present High Bench, Mr. Justice Douglas, considers the corporate
charter a sufficient link to the state to make the Constitution appli-
cable. )251 In addition, there are scattered decisions by both federal and
State courts, concerning union membership in the main, that tend in
that direction.252 So, too, do actions of the avowedly political branches
of government: If one takes an expansive view of the manner in which
the Constitution may be altered, then the precepts of the Civil Rights
Act of 19642" and presidential actions relating to nondiscrimination
in employment by government contractors2 4 constitute a recognition
that ostensibly private entities should (must) follow the Constitution.
It should not be inferred that corporate due process has proceeded
very far or has even been recognized as valid by many commentators.
For that matter, for much of public government that process which is
"due" is notably absent, as witness, for example, federal contract
awards and the distribution of federal largesse. Despite Marsh and
other judicial decisions and the actions by Congress and the President,
the concept has far more potentiality as a means of effecting corporate
accountability than it has actuality. However, it may be an idea "whose
time has come," as Alexander Pekelis predicted 20 years ago.2"5  The
next generation of constitutional lawyers, he said, would ever increas-
ingly be concerned with private governments. Corporate due process,
within a broadly defined corporate community, will be a major part
of that concern.
Turning now to the other part of accountability - "public-
interest" decisions - we may begin with a statement of Professor
Grant McConnell: "[A] substantial part of government in the United
States has come under the influence or control of narrowly based and
largely autonomous elites. These elites do not act cohesively with
each other on many issues. They do not 'rule' in the sense of com-
manding the entire nation. Quite the contrary, they tend to pursue
249. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), noted in 13 VILL. L. Rlv.
199 (1967).
250. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
251. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 184 (1961) (concurring opinion).
252. See the citations in Miller, The Corporation as a Private Government in the
World Community, 46 VA. L. REv. 1539, 1553 n.54 (1960).
253. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
254. E.g., Exec. Order No. 11,264, 3 C.F.R. § 97 (1966), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp.
III, 1968).
255. Pekelis, supra note 248.
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a policy of noninvolvement in the large issues of statesmanship, save
where such issues touch their own particular concerns. ' 256 The prob-
lem this poses is to establish a means whereby decisions on such issues
can be taken "in the national interest." We have learned the invalidity
of the assumption that the decisions of the corporations redound
through the invisible hand of the market to the benefit of all. But we
have not yet determined how to institutionalize a system of insuring
that the supercorporations work in tandem, rather than at cross pur-
poses, with government. Suggested above in this Article is the view
that such an institutionalization is being effected through the over-
arching concept of economic planning. Even if that be accepted, some
quite difficult problems remain.
One is the substantive content of the concept of the public or
national interest. No one has as yet been able to produce workable
meanings of the concept.2 57 Another is the question of who is to
determine that meaning? Is it the President? Does he have to give
reasons (i.e., justify those assertions) ? If public policy decisions often
tend to be made by the "techno-structures" in industry and government,
are they to be equated with the overall common good? Merely posing
such questions will reveal that the problem, although of highest im-
portance, is more emergent than solved. The problems of governance
in the techno-corporate state may be the age-old problems that have
always faced homo sapiens, but they have taken on added urgency in
recent decades. They pose the complex problem of the management
of social change so as to preserve and enhance the democratic values.
That is a problem that makes the technical problems of science insignifi-
cant. Scientists and technologists tend to take on the manageable, to
undertake problems that have a good chance of resolution. Compare
in this respect a statement by Dr. Alvin Weinberg with one by Adam
Yarmolinsky: said the former, "The technologist is appalled by the
difficulties faced by the social engineer; to engineer even a small social
change by inducing individuals to behave differently is always hard
even when the change is rather neutral or even beneficial .... By con-
trast, technological engineering is simple .... ,,21s Said the latter:
"Social scientists particularly have to deal in situations in which any
sensible person would throw up his hands and go home. ' 259
(10) The concept of constitutional duty: Traditionally, the Con-
stitution has been considered to run against governments only; it
256. G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 339 (1966).
257. See Miller, supra note 149.
258. Weinberg, Can Technology Replace Social Engineeringf, U. CHI. MAG., Oct.,
1966, at 6.
259. Quoted in W. MACKENZIE, POLITICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 306 (1967).
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has been a set of negative limitations - of a number of "thou shalt
nots" - rather than affirmative commands. The coming of the Positive
State and of the techno-corporate state now presents the emergent
question of whether the Constitution embodies a concept of a duty to do
certain things as well as a concept of a duty not to do others. If the
Positive State is a form of government that has taken on affirmative
duties through the political process, these duties have been constitu-
tionalized to the extent that they have received the imprimatur of the
Supreme Court (either directly or by refusing to rule).26O In that
sense, the modern state does envisage affirmative duties; but does it
do so in areas where Congress has not acted? Evidence is available
tending to show the emergence of such a concept; these may be found
in judicial decisions concerning race relations, legislative reapportion-
ment, and review of administrative decisions.
. What is required at the outset is a conception of constitutional
adjudication that looks to the consequences of judicial decisionmaking
as well as to the doctrine espoused - in other words, a jurisprudence
of consequences is a necessity.261 Is the operative impact of recent
Court decisions creating such a jurisprudence?
We may begin a discussion of that question with a quotation from
the Declaration of Delhi, made in 1959 by the International Congress
of Jurists:
This International Congress of Jurists ....
Recognizes that the Rule of Law is a dynamic concept for
the expansion and fulfilment of which jurists are primarily respon-
sible and which should be employed not only to safeguard and
advance the civil and political rights of the individual in a free
society, but also to establish social, economic, educational and
cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations and
dignity may be realized .... ..
That statement attempts to place a radically new twist to the conven-
tional view of the rule of law. Another dimension, in the form of a
social content, is added to the concept. What has been a legal formula,
equated with procedural and substantive due process and concerned
260. See Miller, Constitutional Revolution Consolidated: The Rise of the Positive
State, 35 Gvo. WASH. L. Rev. 172 (1966).
261. The nearest approach to this need is that of Professors Myres S. McDougal
and Harold D. Lasswell. See Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943). This
and other publications of the two are calls for action, rather than statements of sub-
stantive content.
262. INTE RNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE RULE ov LAW IN A F04
SOCIETY 3 (N. Marsh ed. 1960) (emphasis added).
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with the protection of the individual against arbitrary actions of the
government, now includes (to the extent that it is or will be accepted)
affirmative governmental obligations. In its new formulation, it sym-
bolizes justice in a sense going far beyond its purely procedural mean-
ing. -In Aristotle's terms, the rule of law would include distributive
justice as well as corrective. justice. A different relationship between
state and individualis posited: if the rule of law is now to be "a dynamic
concept," duties. are imposed upon the state to take action for the en-
hancement of human dignity. "This social content of the Rule of Law
and the recognition of the necessity to make law and find law with
due regard to.the everchanging conditions of human existence expands
the concept of the Rule of Law from the limited scope of static notions
and approximates it with the Rule of Life ... "203
A few scattered decisions and some commentary in law journals
tends to support such a notion. For example, the concurring opinion
of Justice Robert H. Jackson in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,2 *
involving public utility ratemaking, indicates that he believed that
the FPC should act more intelligently in order to further the public
interest. The Court, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,26' told
the same Commission that it had a wider jurisdiction than it wanted
to exercise. Two recent decisions in the Courts of Appeals have ex-
panded the concept of "standing" to challenge administrative action;
in so doing, they tend to impose a higher standard of conduct on the
administrator.266 In race relations, the Prince Edward County case,207
Judge J. Skelly Wright's decision in the District of Columbia School
case, 26 and the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision on school integration 26 9
are a few straws in the wind of affirmative obligation. So, too, is
Reitman v. Mulkey, 270 the case that struck down Proposition 14 in
California; and a clutch of decisions in the October 1965 term of
the Supreme Court that point in the direction of governmental duty.271
There are other decisions, of which those involving legislative reappor-
tionment are particularly noteworthy. But enough has perhaps been
263. Lalive, Foreword to id. at vii (emphasis added).
264. 320 U.S. 591, 628 (1944).
265. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
266. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
267. Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
268. Hobson v. Hansen, 252 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1966), in which Judge J. Skelly
Wright invalidated de facto segregation in the District of Columbia.
269. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). For fuller discussion of the notion of "constitutional
duty," see Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, to be published in
SUPROME COURT RgvlEw (P. Kurland ed. 1968).
270. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
271. Cf. Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARV. L. Rev. 91 (1966), citing cases.
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said to indicate that human freedom is as much positive as negative
in nature, that liberty has a social basis, and that government possibly
has a constitutional duty to take action to ameliorate inadequate
social conditions.
The concept has been little recognized in the literature. How-
ever, in 1967 Professor Jerome Barron argued in the Harvard Law
Review that the mass media were under a constitutional duty to
make space or time available to dissident groups. In other words,
he maintained that a constitutional right of access to the press should
become a part of the law.172 And Professor Archibald Cox, in the
November 1966 issue of the Harvard Law Review, seems to argue
in favor of a concept of constitutional duty - although he is interested
primarily in the power of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.273 And the present writer, in an article published in
1962,274 suggested that the time has come to recognize an affirmative
thrust to due process of law.
There are many problems with such a concept. Who should have
standing to challenge governmental action? 'How could a judicial
decree be enforced? What criteria should guide the Court's decisions?
Would this make the Court too much a group of "philosopher kings,"
oligarchic in nature and responsible to no one (save for the improbable
remedy of impeachment)? Is it better for policies to be enunciated
politically or judicially? Norman S. Marsh, discussing the Declara-
tion of Delhi, summed up some of the problems in the concept of
affirmative duty:
On the one hand if the ideal of a Free Society is accepted as the
basis of the conception of the Rule of Law, it is impossible to
ignore that aspect of man's dignity and worth which finds expres-
sion in a demand for a minimum standard of material well-being
and educational opportunity. On the other hand, it is precisely
the so-called positive rights which the traditional legal machinery
is ill adapted to enforce, except sometimes indirectly by insisting
that whatever benefits the State may bestow, it distributes them
equally between its citizens. Moreover there is a danger that an
interpretation of the Rule of Law which lays too great an em-
phasis on what the State should do for the individual may end
by forgetting the individual in its enthusiasm for its plans of
collective welfare, the development of which would mark the
decline of a Free Society into something similar to the typical
totalitarian State. It must also be recognized that there is a
danger, if the Rule of Law is to include, or at all events to assume,
a basis of economic and social justice, that the law and lawyers
272. Barron, supra note 116.
273. Cox, supra note 271.
274. Miller, supra note 128.
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may find it difficult to assert that measure of detachment from
the immediate policies of a party or group in power which is an
important aspect of the legal function in society.
It would be wrong to claim that there is a neat and conclusive
answer to these problems. The most that can be expected is the
different dangers are always kept in mind. 75
The "lack of detachment" that Marsh mentions has been noted above
in the context of a discussion of the "politicization" of law and the
legal process. It is already happening; one of the problems of the day
is how it can be stopped or controlled.
The problem of constitutional obligation is greatly magnified
when the concept of private governance is added to that of traditional
public government. In other words, if the techno-corporate state en-
compasses both officialdom and the supercorporations, then it will be
far more difficult to judicially enunciate and enforce norms of dis-
tributive justice. But the problem is there, whatever its size. The
next generation of constitutional lawyers will be concerned not only
with the dimension of private governments; they will also be working
out the details of the concept of duty under a Constitution that speaks
in terms of limitations.
(11) "Future orientation": The final problem in this listing of
those raised by the coming of the techno-corporate state is the need
for "forward looking." We have suggested above that "ad hoc-ism"
is no longer viable. Policy by drift, by waiting for problems to evolve,
is no longer adequate; "muddling through" sounds good but it is
hardly up to the need in a time when scientists and technologists,
aided by the pseudo-scientists (such as economists), are inventing the
future." 6 As Olaf Helmer recently said, "The fatalistic view that
the future is unforeseeable and inevitable is being abandoned. It is
being recognized that there are a multitude of possible futures and
that appropriate intervention can make a difference in their proba-
bilities. This raises the exploration of the future, and the search for
ways to influence their direction, to activities of great social responsi-
bility. This responsibility is not just an academic one; to discharge
it more than perfunctorily we must cease to be mere spectators in our
own ongoing history, and participate with determination in molding
the future. It will take wisdom, courage and sensitivity to human
275. Marsh, The Background of the Congress of Delhi, J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS,
Spring-Summer, 1959, at 53-54. See C. RADCLIPPS, TH4 LAW AND ITS COMPASS(1960).
276. See D. GABOR, INV9NTING THZ FUTURrS (1964).
FALL 1968]
71
Miller: Toward the Techno-Corporate State - An Essay in American Constitu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
values to shape a better world." 2" The problem, as Hasan Ozbekhan
recently said in connection with a discussion of "dossier technology,"
is that it transcends the merely technical: "We do not quite under-
stand the complex legal, jurisdictional and, ultimately, constitutional
mechanisms that are involved.
'27 8
What, then, is called for is value clarification and the clarification
of goals, the determination of alternative ways of reaching those goals,
and attention paid to the politico-legal structures and institutions that
will maximize the probability of attaining postulated goals. In short,
this means a new type of thinking, the type of thinking Professor
J.D.B. Mitchell called for when he noted that lawyers have not tried
"to exercise the political imagination which is necessary to create the
source of a system of administrative law which will be able to deal, in
the future, with the state we are creating now. ' 279 The technocrats
of the techno-corporate state are inventing the future, aided and
abetted by economists and politicians who have made G.N.P. a new
idol. Progress is being equated with technological advance and eco-
nomic efficiency; humanistic values are forgotten. "United States
policy at home exemplifies the madness of technological ideals whereby
more is invested in a voyage to the moon than in the eradication of
disease, poverty and urban anomie."2 ' (That the same may be said
about other nations, including the USSR, does not minimize the point.)
If technology is not to continue to be an "irrepressible force of
nature, to which we must meekly submit,"'" then steps must be taken
to build the type of society that is humanistically oriented. This will
take "future planning," not merely economic planning - and that will
take a new type of thinking by the social engineers. Traditionally, the
lawyers have been in the forefront of those who helped to engi-
neer social change. Whether they will remain so is at best an open
question.2"2 But if they do not, there does not seem to be any
other skill group with the capacity to help effect necessary social
adjustments. The technocrats have taken over: the economists want
to be mathematicians and the political scientists want to be quantifying
behavioralists. The scientists and technologists ride high in the saddle,
on top of an unwieldly human community that can die by being
vaporized by nuclear bombs or by asphixiation from pollution or by
being bred to death from overpopulation. We have not learned to
277. 0. HELMER, SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY (1966), quoted in Jantsch, Forecasting the
Future, Sci. J., Oct., 1967, at 45 (emphasis added).
278. Ozbekhan, Automation, Sci. J., Oct., 1967, at 72.
279. Mitchell, Administrative Law and Parliamentary Control, 38 POL. Q. 360,
373-74 (1967).
280. 1967 THE TIMES (London) LITERARY SUPP. 1060.
281. 110 CONG. REc. 10,480 (1964) (Law Day Address of Vice Admiral Rickover).
282. See Miller, supra note 182.
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apply the human equation in our policies, public or private. But do it
we must if something other than a technological nightmare is now
to be created.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, it has been suggested that the United States is
becoming the techno-corporate state. This is a constitutional change
of the first magnitude. The supposedly neutral values of "technicism"
dominate; the men of power are those we have called the "technocrats,"
who operate with pseudo-objectivity.
The historical meaning of "socialism" has, in this development,
been turned completely over: Those who benefit most from state activity
are the already rich and affluent, while the poor and the disadvantaged,
who traditionally have plumped for socialism, are told to pursue the
elusive path of rugged individualism. The techno-corporate state is
not a system of state socialism; ownership of the units of the economy
rests with private individuals, not the government. But that differ-
ence, while important, does not prohibit a high degree of cooperation
between the units of public government and of private government;
they thus act as two sides of one medal. In the 1930's, an attempt
was made to engraft a form of corporativism on the American political
economy by fiat; the National Industrial Recovery Act 3 was, how-
ever, invalidated by the Supreme Court.2 4 But what developed since,
for reasons of technology and external threat and other coalescing
drives, is that the corporate state is being built little by little, like a
coral reef, through the myriad transactions between government and
the supercorporations. That it will not be declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court is obvious. Less obvious, and another question,
is who is senior or dominant in this relationship? That question
cannot be answered on an either-or basis; business needs government
and government needs business; the technocrats in each institution
have their important roles to play. What they exhibit is a coincidence
in goals, in values. They believe in each other. That those goals and
values may be technological, not humanistic, is one of the burdens that
others must bear in this "time of troubles."
283. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
284. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). The invalidation of provisions
of the Act, however, was not on the ground that it established a type of corporativism,
but on the narrow point of improper delegation of legislative power.
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